Communism in the 21st Century

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Volume 1

The Father of Communism: Rediscovering Marx's Ideas

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Foreword by Terrell Carver

PRAEGER

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[AuQ1] These volumes are dedicated to my brother, Dustin Brincat, who upon reading the *Communist Manifesto* for the first time remarked that the communist ideal is the sensible choice given our world's problems, despite the array of asocial behaviors conditioned by contemporary capitalism seemingly opposed to it. By dedicating this series to him, I hope to convey the depth of my gratitude for all his years of support and the esteem I hold for him.

Contents

Foreword

MARX—AND COMMUNISM

Marx is without doubt the most trenchant, unforgiving, scornful, and systematic critic of capitalism we have.[1] But let's keep him in perspective. There have been far more savage destroyers of the commercial relationships that we know as "the [capitalist] economy." Indeed Marx left a yawning gap in his writings, and even in his activism, between critique and power. Others moved in historically to fill this near-vacuum in appalling ways. In his lifetime he wasn't famous; infamy set in later. Discussion of Marx and communism at the moment puts us in the middle ground.

While people will create and join political movements—small and large—with any number of different things in mind, and indeed in that way engaging in any number of different activities—peaceful and otherwise, it is worth pausing to consider how many people *resisted,* rather than embraced, the practices of capitalism—for one reason or another. These practices were monetary exchange, private property in its more abstract and tradable forms, and wealth accumulation. As Marx often pointed out, and as many people knew already, capitalist practices were often aligned with domination, cruelty, and thuggery. However, this raises the question, who actually fought *for* this system? Who were the shock troops of capitalism? Capitalism didn't happen by accident, nor did it arrive from outer space.

The perhaps surprising answer to this question is to look first to imperialism and colonialism, where there were actual shock troops. We can then project this inwards within the nation-state—and its always violent history of formation—to processes of enclosure, legal and intellectual reformations, expropriation, exploitation, and slavery. Marx did just this in

his earliest journalism, and then jointly with Engels in their *Communist Manifesto*.[2] The latter text undermines rather than reinforces (as is often claimed) the Eurocentric mythologies that northern cultural and religious novelties in themselves produced the industrial revolutions that so occupied Marx and fascinated Engels.[3] While I am referring to only a sentence or two, it is clear in the *Manifesto* that the "bourgeois mode of production" is kickstarted by the expropriation of capital from the "new" world, and the subsequent trade in luxury products generated by the mines and plantations of chattel slavery or near-equivalent use of labor.[4] And there is considerable testimony in Marx—who spent considerable time citing reliable testimony from others—of the violence inherent in "domestic" processes of social change.[5]

Marx's historically informed and logically sequential explication of how exactly capitalism got to where it was in his day evolves through the chapters of the magisterial *Capital,* Volume I. It is remarkable how little distance there is in theoretical (or perhaps better, philosophical) terms between his work there and our world of hedging, derivatives, even automated trading and the like. Capital for Marx is "self-expanding value," heading toward an infinity because of its abstract limitlessness. Human greed might have its limits, but a world that has "a life of its own," where numerical relationships are the only reality, has none at all.[6] Of course Marx's book doesn't explain exactly how these things work, and it isn't a 101 account of the theory involved in the economics and mathematics that animates these practices today. But he offers a political and philosophical framing for the boom-and-bust capitalism of his time and ours that has appeal because, among other things, it exposes the vacuity of academic subjects that merely presume what needs to be justified. These are the properties and constraints of the intellectual, political, legal, moral, and religious common senses that must be in place for capitalism to make sense of itself as the only game in town.

Common sense of this kind tells us that imperialism and colonialism were—"perhaps"[7]—regrettable, but certainly over and done with, and in any case "over there . . . somewhere else," but not "here," that is, within social and geographical spaces domesticated as homelands (for some). These metropoles were of course very powered up as nation-states pursuing gross national product (GNP) of their own in what were increasingly international markets. But common sense about capitalist development also tells us that democracy—an apparatus of self-legitimating, selectively representative, and highly disciplinary institutions—is a political, *rather than* economic framework, or where the economic system is relevant, it must of course promote freedom, famously conceived by Locke as "life, liberty and property."[8] Locke's ideas didn't come from nowhere, to be sure, but rather from the practicalities of making trading relationships work within or despite religious, communal, and cultural constraints,

hostilities, and counterrevolutions. Marx's project was rather to insist that no political system makes sense as independent of an economic system, and more strongly, that economic systems generate political systems that secure them.[9]

As Marx spotted, identifying freedom with commercialism and consumerism—but more importantly with the property, legal, and political systems that support these things—was the way to recruit adherents to the cause. He had hard work arguing that those who signed on for this earthly liberation were working against their own best interests, and that this promised land, in his view, was as illusory a vision as the religious ones, for which he had nothing but "this-worldly" scorn.[10] For the few who could make it in the capitalist world, it was an undeserved success, falsely attributed to individual effort and hard work. For those who unsurprisingly didn't make it, it was but a lottery ticket with a very slim chance attached.

Summing up so far, I see Marx as a thinker who blew off the conventions and boundary lines of his own time, and as a theorist (which he has now become) stands opposed to their reinforcement in ours. This is on both the academic and the political side of things. Current disciplinary (obviously the irony has faded away) and subdisciplinary (and even interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary) practices make it difficult to disentangle capitalism from democracy, and commercialism from freedom. For Marx, of course, this was easier to do intellectually, but professionally—other than as independent scholar—he had no life at all. Politically things looked hopeful to him in 1848–49, and again in the late 1850s and on into the 1860s, but he died more than a little embittered.

On the political side of things, we are obviously in a world where huge resources are deployed to promote capitalism, co-opt contrary campaigns, erase any concept of class, and undertake violent and murderous projects of state-building as exercises in freedom and democracy. As Marx and Engels succinctly put it, "the power of the modern state is merely a device for administering the common affairs of the whole bourgeois class,"[11] or in other words, the partisan politics of democratic states conforms to what the late Gore Vidal called "the property party."[12] Since Marx's time things have got worse politically for those whose socialism and communism opposes capitalism in principle.

If read politically, and in a certain framing, Marx's work is very good at describing how some things become thinkable, moral, and commonsensical, rather than controversial, immoral, or illegal, for example, profit-making, interest on money, making a person into a laborer and suchlike, as these things often were "before the fall" into capitalism. One of the most interesting discussions in *Capital,* Volume I, is the passage in which Marx philosophizes as to what exactly one human must assume about another in order for commodity exchange (and ultimately capitalism) to

become thinkable and do-able.[13] It is clear that his own political position is quite contrary to this, but meta-theoretical searches for his "moral foundations" have proved inconclusive. But then, as an activist, he didn't need these in making his rhetoric work; only academics would be interested in recondite logics.[14]

Marx's more academic—yet still political—interest was in attacking the economic intellectual establishment of his day, the political economists. Rather more specifically, his focus was on exposing their presuppositions and claims as politically charged, and indeed highly potent. As he said, merely exposing to the reading public their illogicalities and biases, even their omissions and falsehoods, was not enough.[15] A movement contrary to capitalism would have to capture the broad mass of people—and of peoples—and would have to be a reverse or inverted way of remaking the world as sensible and sense-making.

It is an interesting exercise to reread Marx's critique of capitalism—"the society in which the capitalist mode of production prevails"[16]—as a sardonic success story, but rather in a Nietzschean manner, exposing the human capacity for frailty, complicity, perversity, gullibility, hypocrisy, absurdity, and the like. What is difficult is reading his political activism as focused and effective in getting the many on board in order to resist a global social movement—which, as he himself admitted in quite celebratory passages—was remaking the earth, the human "forms of life" all over the planet, and thus the intellectual, moral, and political "common senses" through which the world is (more or less) intelligible to anyone.[17] Class struggle—including class compromise—is the engine through which this intelligibility is constructed, with huge effort, and at huge cost.

On the countercapitalist side of things—at last—we encounter Marx's communism (or socialism—the terms were not particularly well distinguished, or even distinguishable at the time). Marx and Engels's critique of previous socialisms—laid out for the world in Part III of their *Communist Manifesto*—built on Engels's previous critical exercises and surveys, more than on anything that Marx had done himself.[18] The polemical sections of the (so-called) *German Ideology* were a (long-winded) run-up to the snappier versions in the *Manifesto,* where Engels's journalistic skills met Marx's sardonic wit and dismissive put-downs.[19]

Recent scholarship has promoted the idea that Marx was not wholly hostile to the "utopians" among the socialists and communists,[20] and indeed this raises the wider perspective that overall—and for political purposes—he has himself been constructed biographically and interpreted academically as necessarily opposite to those whom he criticized. As intellectual biography these constructions and interpretations are prone to drama, where strong characterization and clear contrasts drive the plot. Yet contrary to later dramatizations, Marx was aware that the communists

and socialists he was criticizing were also his coalition partners (along with middle-class liberal revolutionaries in the pre-1848 context).[21] And he was aware of his own identification with the "tendency" and "movement" (the latter more an announcement and call-to-join, rather than a descriptive term as such), not least because of the original title and mission statement of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party.* While the biographers and academics—both pro and con—have concentrated on making Marx distinct from his confreres, closer readings reveal a mutual but critical imbrication. Still, it is possible to discern a particular shape to Marx's communism, or rather to the way he conceived of his role within this quite loose categorization.

Marx was wholly against gurus, personality-cultists with revelatory doctrines and worshipping adherents. He also had absolutely nothing to do with religious framings, Christian ones in particular. He was resolutely for large-scale transformation (whether violent because in working-class self-defense, or otherwise in some more peaceful transition toward socialism and communism). He had no time for historical anachronism and returns to a golden age of simplicity. Nor was he sympathetic to top-down governance and leadership by enlightened intellects. And he presumed that the mass production of necessities, at least, would raise the quality of life and reduce working time (in some sense).[22]

Curiously, though, none of these movements, or attempted movements, resembles the social forces through which capitalism was establishing itself (and still is). I wonder if Marx gave some attention to the question, "Why was there no *Capitalist Manifesto"*? Both the capitalist and the industrial revolutions (and the one wouldn't have been much without the other) were somewhat unself-conscious movements, or perhaps wealth-creation-for-the-few is such an age-old and obvious idea that it hardly needed to declare itself. Certainly collecting shock troops—whether conquistadors or buccaneers or regulars—wasn't all that difficult, given the development of loanable wealth, as historians have demonstrated. Perhaps if there had been a *Capitalist Manifesto,* certain nations and/or dynasties would have made more successful capital and capitalism from their wealth, for example, Spain and the Hapsburgs. Yet other locales seemed to generate the end-result from few resources, other than a timely readiness with ideas and institutions, for example, the Low Countries. There were certainly any number of enlightened publications on the new thinking and bourgeois lifestyle in a growing literature, but this was not a self-conscious mass movement. Mass action was rather a last resort, as in France in 1789, and—as Marx was at pains to point out—it acquired its shock troops through a democratic sleight of hand, promising equality (of a political sort) and delivering inequality (of economic outcomes).[23]

It seems that with respect to socialism the sum of Marx's shibboleths listed above—and his stated conclusion arising from his critique—was that a groundswell of mentalities, local movements and campaigns, revolts and uprisings would win the day for communism in the only way it could be won. The French Revolution is well known to have been his model, in some respects, because it was driven by democratic anger at ruling classes and outmoded privileges and constraints. It burst out into massive, rapid change, and spread the new ways abroad, picking up adherents (e.g., in Marx's native Rhineland) as old institutions toppled and liberation spread. In simple terms the result was the very striking and violent abolition of feudalism in France in 1789, and the triumph of commercial commonsense that pressed on with revolutionizing social and political relationships, the continuance or restoration of feudal anachronisms notwithstanding. However harsh the counterrevolutions, in France or elsewhere, no post-Napoleonic regime restored feudalism exactly as it had been.

Despite Marx's efforts, democracy and political liberation were the cover story for national liberation *and* commercial liberation in various guises, definitely not a democratic revolt that generalized the interests of the working class to all, a number of honorable exceptions notwithstanding.[24] As a means—albeit messy ones—of throwing off local feudalisms *and* colonial domination, Marx's political rhetoric was of course supportive. However, what he fought against came to pass, namely the one standing for the other (i.e., democracy standing for commercialism), thus reinforcing the very disjunction in political thinking that he had long opposed. Understandably his method of ideology-critique[25] didn't expose the power encompassed by this disjunction, since doing that would work against his aim of overthrowing it. But the political effects of taking democracy to be a solution to inequalities of wealth and power, rather than a highly effective way of explaining these discrepancies away, have been profound. Evidently he had no idea how potent this displacement—of "earthly" economic struggle by "heavenly" realms of supposed equality—could be.[26]

There are of course two ways to take up the task today. One is to formulate an alternative to capitalism (rather than policy palliatives, as social democrats have done). But this strategy easily falls into the logic of mass movements and enthusiasms, doctrinal prophets and crazed leaders, that made the twentieth century so violent and counterproductive to the cause. The other is to do as Marx and Engels did and locate the movement as ongoing already, just needing publicity and (better) explication. This involved explaining the movement to itself, as well as to potential adherents (and of course famously defying the opposition to resist).[27] Michael Hardt (usually in conjunction with Antonio Negri) has taken this line, though I have found *Empire* and *Multitude* rather less punchy and rousing than

Marx and Engels's rhetorical constructions.[28] Hardt's later essay, "The Common in Communism," continues in this vein by taking the common to be a vaguely defined area—probably knowledge production and artistic creativity—that is already produced (so he says) in processes that are external to capital. He describes it as a realm of "autonomous human production" and common because it is characterized by "open access" and sharing.[29]

Perhaps as a metaphor for the elusive concepts of communism that Marx—on famously few occasions—allowed himself to hint at, there is indeed some connection, or possibly of independent value (Marx doesn't have to be right about everything). However, Hardt's approach is decidedly un-Marxian in both ignoring the heavy processes of infrastructure creation and maintenance (or conceivably de-capitalizing and de-industrializing processes of winding this down), and the productive processes through which—his disclaimer notwithstanding—shareable knowledges and stimulating artworks—can conceivably be created for sharing and "open access" at all. Marx's "realm of necessity"[30]—underspecified as it is—or indeed anyone's realm of necessity ought to be making an appearance, or its absence explained away. Marx may have put too much weight on the proletariat as a political subject, and on trade unions as a way forward, but at least these are phenomena that inspire some credibility in their relationship to physical universals and social basics broadly conceived. Or if Hardt is arguing that communism should be going down the road of mutualism through individual autonomy and personal veto (a route Marx criticized as politically unrealistic) then he should say so. Cooperation is no doubt a powerful social force, and in truth it incentivizes more than a few individuals, and possibly more than self-interest in many circumstances. But compared with Marx's theorization, which links class politics with visible productive forces, it suffers the flaw that Marx himself was always swift to focus on: there is no consumption without production.

Methodologically this argues that Marx distinguishes himself—and his communism—from both capitalism and cooperative or welfare socialisms by focusing on social production in the first instance, and thus its organization as the very basis from which law, politics, morality, and all else must proceed. The upshot of this, of course, is that consumption-based theories—whether of liberal democracy or market economics—never achieve a real *commonality* at all, however equally they share out goods and services, or however open their access to goods that have already been produced and aren't apparently scarce. Planned economies, as they were known in the communist world, generally proceeded without much buy-in from the workers (or consumers) involved. The mystery of course is why capitalist economies—regulated and state-driven as they are—generate the buy-in that they do, and from workers in particular. It may

be that the buy-in is unraveling now, given the decline in real wages, huge growth in inequality, hypervisibility of undeserved wealth, casualization of employment, and withdrawal of pensions and social services. Perhaps in some instances the magic of patriotic warfare is ceasing to work, given the obvious opportunity costs, not to mention (working-class) lives. In an age of volunteer armies, most powerful states have returned to a cannon-fodder mentality, by which economic necessities and ambitions drive poorer citizens (and, as in the United States, noncitizen green card holders) into the military. These forces are then deployed in ways that have left legislative declarations of war, and lately the Geneva Convention laws of war, far behind, often using "humanitarian intervention" as a cover for what might be geostrategic ambitions. In some cases, such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the tenuousness of the reasoning involved, and the almost insane character of military operations, leaves one quite breathless.[31]

The *Communist Manifesto* left us a list of specificities quite remarkably coincident with (more or less current) visions of social democracy.[32] Indeed in their highly various ways the contributions to these volumes on *Communism in the 21st Century* discuss concepts and views related to the question, "What Is to Be Done?" My task here has been to ponder the question, how did capitalism win over hearts and minds, mobilize large-scale social forces (of revolution, and then counterrevolution), and produce its own list of specificities?[33] In those terms, ideologies of the nation state, and of its democratic institutions, were clear winners, notwithstanding the vast numbers of people who fought—and still fight—tooth and nail for religious universalisms and authoritarian systems that run counter to these now venerable institutions.

As I have argued, the more fundamental economic arguments—about the requirements of the production process and access to the goods and services produced—were largely displaced by being naturalized, or dressed up, or mystified as market relations of consumption, driven by avoidance of the need to labor. While there may be global enthusiasms for saving the environment, or making poverty history, or otherwise promoting a critical focus on capitalism, there is little sense in those theoretical formations of the precise social relationships that would revolutionize the present ones in real life. These are, of course, capital–labor, employer–worker, investor-rentier–wage-earner, propertied homeowner–homeless person, and so on, the familiar categories of the news media, and general common sense. Marx's genius was to alert us to these and make them seem strange.

Marx was right to contrast earlier forms of production with each other in legal and social terms, as he did with preclassical and ancient slavery, feudal systems of vassalage, and tenure.[34] He was then able to identify precisely and in exact detail where the conceptual, moral, legal, and allied areas of the specific subjectivity of capitalism creep in, or storm in, as the case may be. But he didn't work out the opposing fundamentals

of communism at that level. The chapters in the present volumes are contributions to ongoing efforts to overcome a human system that generates—but offloads—all kinds of negative externalities, as they are known in capitalism-speak. These are much harder on some than on others, but then escape from the other is yet another fantasy trope of capitalism with wide appeal. "We are all in it together" is a notorious piece of cant, but also an inescapable truism. As a way of thinking about this, communism is much better than most.

—Terrell Carver

NOTES

1. In numerous works and lectures, David Harvey is doing an excellent job making this point; see for example *A Companion to Marx's Capital* (London: Verso, 2010) and *The Enigma of Capital: And the Crises of Capitalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

2. For a discussion of Marx's early journalism (sadly neglected for its lack of engagement with Hegel), see Heinz Lubasz, "Marx's Initial Problematic: The Problem of Poverty," *Political Studies* 24, no. 1 (1976): 24–42; for a fresh translation of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* from the first edition, see Karl Marx, *Later Political Writings,* ed. and trans. Terrell Carver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1–30. References to the *Manifesto* are taken from this edition.

3. See the discussion of Eurocentrism and development in Sankaran Krishna, *Globalization and Postcolonialism: Hegemony and Resistance in the Twenty-first Century* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 7–30; for a discussion of the *Communist Manifesto* in this context, see Terrell Carver, "Ideology in the Age of Digital Reproduction," in *Rethinking Globalism,* ed. Manfred B. Steger (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 95–105.

4. Marx and Engels, *Manifesto,* 2. My use of new, trade, and labor is ironic, as the terms otherwise presuppose settled usages that normalize what we know about capitalism and its moral and historical relationship with historiography and social studies; see Robbie Shilliam, "Marx's Path to Capital: The International Dimension of an Intellectual Journey," *History of Political Thought* 29, no. 2 (2006): 349–75.

5. Karl Marx, *Capital,* vol. 1, in *Marx-Engels Collected Works,* vol. 35, ed. Frederick Engels (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1996), 704–761.

6. See the detailed discussion in Terrell Carver, "Marx—And Hegel's Logic," *Political Studies* 24, no. 1 (1976), 57–68.

7. Niall Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2004), is the *locus classicus* for this line of argument.

8. John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government,* ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

9. For an explication that emphasizes the guiding thread qualities of Marx's method, see Terrell Carver, *Marx's Social Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).

10. For a discussion of the political relationship between economic and religious rhetoric in Marx's *Capital*, see Terrell Carver, *The Postmodern Marx* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 7–24.

11. Marx and Engels, *Manifesto,* 3.

12. Gore Vidal, *Matters of Fact and Fiction: Essays 1973–1976* (New York: Random House, 1977).

13. These passages are explicated in detail in Carver, *Postmodern Marx,* 33–37.

14. The best of these discussions, in my view, was R. G. Peffer, *Marxism, Morality and Social Justice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

15. Marx, *Capital,* vol. 1, 84–86.

16. Ibid., 45.

17. Marx and Engels, *Manifesto,* parts I and II.

18. See the detailed discussions of Engels's early thought and journalism in Terrell Carver, *Friedrich Engels: His Life and Thought* (London: Macmillan, 1989), 101–132.

19. See the detailed textual comparisons in Terrell Carver, *Marx and Engels: The Intellectual Relationship* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983), 51–95.

20. See the detailed contextual and textual discussions in David Leopold, *The Young Karl Marx: German Philosophy, Modern Politics, and Human Flourishing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 279–295.

21. For a discussion of Marx's coalition politics and his relationship to democracy, see Carver, *Postmodern Marx,* 119–145.

22. Ibid., 87–118.

23. I am drawing on a very large, and more or less Marxist historiography here, the works of Robert Brenner and Ellen Meiksins Wood in particular.

24. See Marx's encomium on the Paris Commune in his *The Civil War in France,* in *Later Political Writings,* 163–207.

25. For a detailed discussion, see Terrell Carver, "The Politics of Ideologie-Kritik: Socialism in the Age of Neo/Post-Marxism," *New Political Science* 31, no. 4 (2009): 461–474.

26. See the detailed textual discussions on Marx's politics in Leopold, *Young Karl Marx,* 100–182.

27. Marx and Engels, *Manifesto,* 1.

28. See Terrell Carver, "Less than Full Marx . . .," *Political Theory* 34, no. 3 (2006): 351–356.

29. Michael Hardt, "The Common in Communism," *Rethinking Marxism* 22, no. 3 (2010): 346–356.

30. Karl Marx, *Capital,* vol. 3, in *Marx-Engels Collected Works,* vol. 37, ed. Frederick Engels (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1998), 806–807.

31. I have particularly in mind Rajiv Chandrasekaran's *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Baghdad's Green Zone* (London: Bloomsbury, 2008). There is of course a very large critical literature on global politics, post-9/11.

32. Marx and Engels, *Manifesto,* part IV.

33. On these specificities, see Manfred B. Steger and Ravi Roy, *Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

34. Karl Marx, "Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,*" in Marx, *Later Political Writings,* 159–161.

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Preface to Volume 1

Marx's importance as a leading political theorist, economist, and philosopher and his legacy as the leading figure in communist thought is beyond doubt. Indeed, it is reported that Marx and Engels's *Communist Manifesto* has been read so widely that it is eclipsed only by the readership of the Bible. Marx's influence cuts across all disciplines in the social sciences and humanities and there continues to be an ever-increasing number of books, articles, and essays that explore all dimensions of his expansive work. In the wake of the ongoing global financial crisis from 2008, there has been a resurgence of interest in Marx's thought—even within the mainstream of the academy—that attests to the ongoing relevance of both his critique of capitalism and his vision of a free, communist association. Nevertheless, despite this array of scholarly engagement, Marx's vision of communism has remained under-theorized and has rarely been systematically investigated, with a few notable exceptions being the work of Ollman and Lebowitz, both of whom contributed to this project. This volume arose specifically to overcome this significant gap in the literature by providing a holistic engagement with Marx's ideas on communism from a variety of theoretical and normative viewpoints that could both give content to how Marx envisioned future, communist society, and to explore the relevance—and potential developments of this ideal—in the context of the early 21st century. The difficulty was in locating scholars who could add to the diversity of perspectives on this topic, without which the volume would soon become repetitive, if not myopic.

With this purpose in firm view, the volume was organized around 10 distinctly themed interpretations of Marx's vision of communism including cultural, socialist, individualist, dialectical, humanist, cosmopolitan, utopian, feminist, environmental, and Romantic perspectives. Each

chapter offers a unique assessment of the legacy and potential within Marx's vision of communism in contemporary political life. The chapters were then rearranged and organized into two halves in a way that emerged organically from the set as a whole. These two groupings are not a formal separation but order the collection into a coherent flow between the 10 specific themes. The first half focus on reconstructions (or rediscoveries) of Marx's work specifically related to communism. Here, Eagleton, Sayers, Chattopadhyay, Ollman, and Lebotwitz, despite their sometimes radically different interpretations, all give primary consideration to passages in which Marx discussed, in however fragmented form, his approach to communism. The second half, while still premised as critical explorations of Marx's vision of communism, attempt to develop these ideas from a variety of perspectives. These contributions, including me, Paden, Federici, Burkett, and Löwy, all constructively engage with the ideal of communism, serving to highlight areas for the future development of this concept in both theory and practice. The focused analysis and analytical depth of each separately themed chapter on Marx's vision of communism—via a variegated interpretive group of scholars from diverse backgrounds, theoretical orientations, and normative positions—offers a comprehensive and thorough reexamination of the father of communist ideas at the start of the 21st century.

One particular problem faced in such a diverse volume is uniformity of sources on Marx and, to a lesser degree, Engels. Marx's writings comprise a vast amount of literature, including numerous collections, anthologies, and commentaries of his work. While a number of these collections are present in this volume, by far the most cited (though not exclusively) is the English translation *Marx-Engels Collected Works,* abbreviated elsewhere as MECW. This collection comprises 50 volumes in all and was compiled and printed by Progress Publishers of the Soviet Union in collaboration with Lawrence & Wishart (London) and International Publishers (New York), starting in 1975 and completed in 2005. This collection was chosen for this volume as the most complete publication of the works of Marx and Engels in English and because it is regarded as one of the best translations of Marx and Engels's work in any language. Indeed, this collection has been the source of much of the material for the entire series of *Communism in the 21st Century* and particularly so for Volume 1, "The Father of Communism: Rediscovering Marx's Ideas." However, authors were encouraged to source other translations and reference materials of Marx and Engels's work as they saw fit, some used materials in other languages and some from their own translations. As such, the volume does not profess to offer an authoritative account of Marx and Engels's work, an issue that raises concerns of non-uniformity and uncertainty but which, at the same time, offers a rich vibrancy in interpretations and ensures reflexivity. Diversity

in interpretation was considered the greater prize for forming a collusive relationship between Marx's texts, translator and the reader, over uniformity, which in many respects remains an unrealizable ideal. From this there does emerge a difficulty for the reader regarding occasional differences between the use of terms and differences in translations of passages between authors and chapters that could not be overcome.

On behalf of Praeger, I would like to acknowledge, with sincere gratitude, permissions to reproduce texts, in part or in-full, including: Paul Burkett's "Marx's Vision of Sustainable Human Development" from the *Monthly Review;* Terry Eagleton's "In Praise of Marx" from *The Chronicle of Higher Education;* and Roger Paden's "Marxism, Utopianism, and Modern Urban Planning," and "Marx's Critique of the Utopian Socialists" from *Utopian-Studies.* We would also like to thank Palgrave and Macmillan for permission to cite passages and materials from Sean Sayer's *Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes.*

I would like to acknowledge the copyediting work of Caitlin Sparks for her careful diligence and attention to detail in the final preparation of this volume. All errors and inconsistencies are, of course, my own. This volume would not have been possible without the work of a group of anonymous reviewers and fellow contributors who assisted greatly with strengthening each of the chapters. This series has formed part of my University of Queensland Postdoctoral Research Fellowship and I would like to thank the School of Political Science and International Studies for its support for this type of critical scholarship.

Shannon K. Brincat
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INTRODUCTION

Communism in the 21st Century: Vision and Sublation

Shannon K. Brincat

The world is undergoing a profound period of crises and transformation. The ongoing Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has spiraled, forcing austerity measures across communities and states, pushing the neoliberal project into sharp contradictions, if not immediate collapse; the Arab Spring has swept forward calls for democratic process and related freedoms across, and beyond, the Middle East and North Africa; in cities around all around the world the Occupy movement has ushered in a new era of radical politics, one that seeks to build an emancipated future, free of domination and hierarchy, within a profoundly new public sphere. Indeed, this civil discord and radical potential has brought forward a proliferation of protest movements within communities and states—antiwar, anti-globalization, anti-austerity—that exist alongside ongoing political struggles for the recognition and rights of women, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT), indigenous, and postcolonial peoples, and environmental campaigns that seek to promote sustainability, biodiversity, and climate stability.

Clearly, politics in the early stages of the 21st century is marked by dissent, tumult, and calls for radical change. And behind all these crises and transformative processes is the "specter of communism," as ubiquitous as it was in 1848 when Marx and Engels wrote this opening line of the *Communist Manifesto.* The title of this series, *Communism in the 21st Century*, may at first seem circumspect given we are only in the century's second decade. It is far too early to offer any definitive statements regarding the potentials and the perils facing communism in this new millennium, let alone offer conclusions about its direction. Nevertheless,

both the theory and practice of communism are undergoing a veritable resurgence. This resurgence has been given impetus by the financial crisis of the last few years, but it has also been motivated by the ever-apparent limitations of the state as political community, including its inability to steer the economy, remedy the dissolution of social and cultural bonds under the weight of "callous cash payment," or address fundamental environmental threats to human existence and all complex biological life. The title was chosen specifically to locate the study of communist thought and practice as it attempts to mediate these challenges, with the underlying assumption that communism has not diminished in its potential reach or radicalism.

Yet despite the radical potential of the communist project, the global economy remains transfixed in an economic morass. Under the ongoing strictures of the GFC, academics in the social sciences and humanities, and activists the world over have been looking for viable alternatives to the neoliberal orthodoxy, its indelible contradictions now visible to even the most foolhardy Reaganite, Thatcherite, or Hayekian. The urgency of this search has been compounded by the worsening conditions of global politics, where the many facets of neo-imperialism threaten to overwhelm collective social-moral learning in international society, creating the conditions for hyperexploitation of the peripheries and heightening the possibility of international conflict. Underlying this geopolitical rivalry is the impending environmental catastrophe associated with climate change, which has made the question of political alternatives no longer one of ideology but of human survival. This intersection between financial collapse, increasing international tensions, and environmental pressures seems to demand a re-envisioning of the political, expanding the notion of community and embracing political possibility *beyond* capital and the state. These tendencies have directly contributed toward the reimagination of communism as a meaningful alternative to the stultifying conditions of world capitalism, the aggressive and ossifying doctrines of realpolitik and the predation of our natural world. This series is written in the spirit of revival animating the contemporary theory and practice of communism.

But these volumes do not aim to restate the ghosts of communism's past. Gone is the scientific certitude and dogmatism of Diamat ideology, which believed that the formation of communism was a determined outcome, reliant only on the development of productive forces. Gone also is the acceptance of political authoritarianism that tainted earlier and still existing forms of communist practice—the litany of failed projects and the crimes committed in the name of communism, the horrors of the Gulag, Stalinization, the Cultural Revolution, and the Killing Fields, among others. Replacing such totalizing projects is a healthy suspicion of revolutionary vanguards and a reassertion of humanist ethics

like emancipation, participation, and co-creation, which were so pronounced in Marx's earlier works. What we see here is not a narrowing of the aspirational dimensions of communist thought but a firming of its commitment to struggle. Determinism and authoritarianism have been rejected. But we have regained the most fundamental tenet of revolutionary thought: *that change is up to us.* History does not unfold along some predetermined path, led by a metaphysical dialectic. Our future, as our history, is made by our hands—emancipation can only ever be the confluence of our choices and actions.

* * *

ABOUT THE SERIES

Structure

In recent years there has been a veritable explosion of scholarship on the theory and practice of communism. Alain Badiou's *The Communist Hypothesis* was a clear turning point in the literature that revivified the idea of communism as the logic that class subordination was not something inevitable. It could be overcome through the collective reorganization of society, based on a free association of producers, that would eliminate the division of labor and the coercive state. Though Badiou contended that we are far from realizing this "community of equals," it was in "formulating and testing the communist hypothesis" that Badiou has since inspired myriad explorations on this idea.[1] One of the most significant and ongoing collaborations on this theme has been Costas Douzinas and Slavoj Žižek's edited volume, *The Idea of Communism,* which followed the London conference inspired by Badiou's call to arms. Emphasizing emancipation and the commons, these works have offered explorations of how to carry the communist idea forward in a world of financial and social turmoil, claiming nothing less than that the "long night of the Left" is, finally, coming to a close. The contributors to these volumes each share the view that we need to distinguish the state from communism and expand the politics of inclusion, with the underlying belief that communism remains an abundant resource for radical politics oriented toward emancipation.[2]

In this context, works of particular note by Jodi Dean, Bruno Bosteels, and Michael Lebowitz have sought to make the communist vision a reality. Dean has argued for the need to organize as a party on the basis of our common and collective desires, Bosteels has sought to move beyond lofty abstractions to thoroughly rethink communism through a dialogue with a number of key thinkers on the Left, and Lebowitz has offered a model of the socialist alternative through the "socialist triangle" of social production, democratic organization, and new social relations beyond self-interest.[3] Others, while not associating with communist ideology directly

have, like Guy Standing's conception of "The Precariat"[4] or David Graeber's history of debt,[5] focused on various facets of contemporary capitalist socioeconomic relations and their deformation. In distinction, Hardt and Negri's trilogy *Empire, Multitude* and *Commonwealth* has been one of the most influential attempts at understanding the interrelations, at the global level, between war, class, and the commons, in which communism is to be once again associated with the sociality that defines human relations.[6] Re-engagements with particular aspects of Marx's extensive corpus have proliferated in an expansive literature[7] that has only been surpassed by a growing number of examinations, inspired by a communist point of view, of the various aspects of the financial and environmental crises—a list too exhaustive to engage here.

What is notable in each of these accounts is the shared belief in the possibilities immanent within the idea of communism, something reflected equally throughout the three volumes of *Communism in the 21st Century.* However, what distinguishes this series from the plethora of recent works in this subject-area is the three aims that frame the project as a whole and which are reflected in each individual volume: (1) a re-engagement with the ideas of Marx; (2) an assessment of the challenges, past and present, facing communist movements, parties, and states; and (3) perspectives on the future possibilities of communist theory and practice. While each volume is stand-alone, together they offer a fluid account of the past, present, and future of communism located in the conditions of the early 21st century.

The periodic crises of capitalism seem, almost as a logical necessity, to bring with them a resurgence of interest in viable alternatives. The GFC was no exception. Marx's work has undergone nothing less than a revival, being read by all concerned parties, from German bankers to the radicals in Zuccotti Park, not only as a means to explain the phenomena of recurrent economic crises but to fill the void left by the fall of this dominant ideology.[8] Volume 1, *The Father of Communism,* situates the series within this rehabilitation of communist theory. It engages with the ongoing importance of Marx's vision of communism for contemporary radical, emancipatory politics. Despite the centrality of communism to Marx's philosophy and political economy, a detailed engagement with his ideal has been curiously absent in the literature, such that communism has remained one of the most under-theorized aspects of Marx's work within both political science and philosophy.[9] Without such an explication, Marx's ideal has been left to unnecessary obfuscation that—when coupled with the oppressive regimes associated with its name and the collapse of the Soviet project—have served only to further mystify what could be a potentially liberating force in contemporary politics. This volume attempts to overcome this oversight. The volume is organized around 10 themed interpretations of Marx's concept of communism: cultural, socialist, individualist,

dialectical, humanist, cosmopolitan, utopian, feminist, environmental, and romantic. Through this diverse interpretive group of scholars, theoretical orientations, and normative positions, the volume offers a unique, contrasting, and variegated assessment of Marx's communist vision and its relevance for contemporary politics in both theory and practice.

Turning toward more practical engagements, Volume 2, *Whither Communism?* focuses on the litany of challenges facing existing communist movements, parties, and states. These challenges are shown to be many and considerable. From the bitter losses of past revolutionary moments to the horrors of failed experiments that continue to resonate, the communist tradition remains mired in a damming, bloody past. The two great bastions of the radical Left, anarchism and communism, remain divided into two hostile camps, as they have been since the demise of the First International. Added to this historical fracturing of the Left, repression of working class and radical movements has intensified across the globe. Many of the reformist gains of Western social-democratic struggle have been lost under the tide of reactionary neoliberalism—or as it is so nonobtrusively labeled under the jargon of economic rationalism, rolled-back. For many peoples in the developing world, these gains were never achieved. These defeats have exposed the intractable limits of reformism, trade unionism, and emancipation through the ballot of the capitalist state. Added to this has been the accretion of crises in finance, production, and employment, alongside the accelerating processes of environmental degradation as late capitalism reaches what is perhaps its terminal phase. Against this tumultuous background, the question of *Whither Communism?* takes on a significance that is not purely historical. For in the context of today's mounting crises the question is no longer, as Rosa Luxembourg once asked, "socialism or barbarism?"; instead, one might say "socialism or extinction?"

Volume 2 begins by examining the continuing significance of key historical events and debates within communism. The tensions between communism and anarchism, the splits within leftist parties and groups within the Internationals, and the capitalist restoration after the demise of the Soviet system all illustrate that communism's past continues to frame the possibilities of the present. But this volume also offers a contemporary analysis of actually existing states that identify as communist, including the economic form of Chinese communism and its rise as the next global superpower; the paradox of North Korea as a communist, dynastic, and pariah state; the changes underway in Vietnamese Socialism as it mediates modernity and development; and the likely direction of change in Cuba with the passing of the Castro era. Alongside these statist communist projects, the volume also examines past and ongoing communist experiments that indicate a certain transcendence of the traditional communist mantra about the capture of state power. Here, novel developments in

the Mexican Commune, Venezuela's transition to socialism, and a global accounting of radical working-class socialism in the early 21st century all indicate an open horizon for the forms of communist struggle and organization to meet the challenges of the present and near future.

Building upon and extending the contemporary focus of Volume 2, Volume 3, *The Future of Communism,* analyzes the trajectory of communist struggles, theoretical developments, and organizational praxis into the 21st century. Its theoretical and empirical content offers an indication of the direction communist ideas and practices are taking in shaping this century. The opening chapters examine existing revolutionary and protest movements and their global implications for revivifying communism as a lived social struggle—the World Social Forum (WSF), the Arab Spring, and Occupy, that have all attempted to build alternative futures. These recent movements are set against the background of the unique challenges facing communism in the present, including globalization, digital and communicative technologies, and the problem of value and the commons. This is paralleled with ongoing theoretical developments in communist thought, such as the rapprochement between feminism and communism and the question of the means and ends of revolution in critical theory. Turning to the dimensions of communist praxis, the volume offers insights pertaining to organization in contemporary radical movements. It engages with the militant, the assembly, and communizing, where communism—at least for John Holloway—becomes a process with many points of intersections that exist in the possibilities of the *now.*

Across all these chapters, it seems communism in the 21st century promotes participatory social, economic, and political organization against centralization; calls for harmony through the commons in opposition to commodification; embraces philosophical critique rather than certainty or determinism; and deploys new methods of organization and resistance opposed to the methods of vanguardism and political power, particularly through the state. These examples suggest that the communist horizon—to borrow from Jodi Dean—has expanded considerably from its early manifestations, that the long night of communism *is* coming to an end, and that the dawn is indeed bright for human emancipation in this century.

* * *

Themes

The choice of authors for this volume was based on the notion that diversity would lead to a fuller and more dynamic engagement with the question of communism in the 21st century. As such, it is a difficult task to draw out thematic commonalities and even more difficult to draw these with analytical precision. Yet while the plurality of interpretations does

not graft neatly to some shared viewpoint on communism, some convergences are evident. In this part my primary aim is to draw out the key arguments from each chapter and, as a secondary goal, where possible, to observe any commonalities that emerge within the series taken as a whole. With this in mind, I actively deploy the words of each author in an attempt to weave, as closely as possible, some of these common themes without distorting—willfully or unaware—the unique meaning of each theorist.[10] Needless to say, the contributors to this series do not agree on the idea of communism, their interpretation of Marx's (and Engels's) vision of communism, or of the history, present and future trajectory of communism in the 21st century. The following discussion does not therefore claim agreement in its absence, nor is it intended to foist a synthesis or closure when there is none. Rather, my intention is to illuminate the primary arguments and some of the common themes that emerge even within the diverse array of interpretations, methods, and political commitments contained within *Communism in the 21st Century.*

Volume 1: The Father of Communism

Emphasizing the ongoing importance of Marx's vision of communism for radical and emancipatory politics, in the opening chapter of the series Terry Eagleton does nothing less than praise Marx (Chapter 1, Volume 1). He praises him as a profound moral thinker, a Romantic humanist (a finding shared by Löwy in Chapter 10, Volume 1), whose key insight was the understanding that true self-fulfillment of the individual's powers and capacities could only take place socially, that is, in and through one another. Achieving these distinctive qualities at the interpersonal level is called, by Eagleton, *love,* and at the political level, *socialism.* Echoing these same humanistic dimensions, Sean Sayers affirms that Marx's ideal of communism is ontological. That is, human beings are endowed with universal capacities and powers, and yet to exercise and develop these fully requires replacing the notion of wealth derived from classical political economy with communism's notion concerning the "wealth of human need."[11] Under communism the development of needs *is* value—the true definition of wealth—because it expands human productive and creative powers.[12] For Sayers, this ideal of communism is essential not only to Marx's appeal as a philosopher but also to the socialist movement: communism is a theory of how society will develop, and how it is actually moving, but it is also an ideal social, economic, and political vision.

The radical humanism in Marx's vision identified by Eagleton and Sayers is also emphasized by Chattopadhyay (Chapter 3, Volume 1) who regards communism as the reunion of humanity. Chattopadhyay focuses on the place of the human individual in Marx's vision of the future society, particularly the laboring individual within what he calls the Association

Mode of Production. Through the movement toward socialism, human beings are no longer personally or materially dependent, so they no longer exist as "fragmented" individuals: alienation is overcome through this reunion, providing the conditions (and relations) in which all human beings can become "totally developed," "integral" individuals. Indeed, for Chattopadhyay, societies can be judged on the extent to which the individual is free within it, that is, suffering neither personal nor objective dependence. Along these lines, Chattopadhyay extols Marx's vision of communism because of the "free individuality" that can be brought about through its socioeconomic form, which he considers is nothing less than a restoration of humanity to its essence, "the real appropriation of the human essence by the human for the human." In my own chapter (Chapter 6, Volume 1), I also explore some of these humanistic themes in the emancipatory dimensions of Marx's vision of communism. In broad agreement with Eagleton, Sayers, and Chattopadhyay, I view communism as Marx's ideal form of socioeconomic organization necessary for the flourishing of humankind's creative powers. However, I develop this through the concepts of species-being (the full self-actualization of one's individual capacities that Marx developed from Ludwig Feuerbach) and the notion of the unalienated or "total man" of the *Paris Manuscripts*.[13] Here, human emancipation and the movement to full communism can be seen as the historical movement that removes all restrictions on the potential development of humanity—something that overcomes the limitations of bourgeois political emancipation—and reunites the private and public essences of humanity.[14]

So, against those who foist upon Marx the oppression and crimes of communist states—and who conveniently forget the genocidal crimes of capitalism—Eagleton shows that it was the question of achieving justice and prosperity for all that was the guiding leitmotif of Marx's vision of communism. Nevertheless, as Chattopadhyay makes painfully clear, Marx's original idea of a socialist society underwent a "total inversion" by those who in the name of Marx(ism) called their regimes socialist. Along similar lines, Michael Lebowitz (Chapter 5, Volume 1) rejects the juridical forms of state-socialism of the 20th century, particularly the Leninist model that rendered unto law the "socialist principle" in which the individual was cast as a worker, not a human being—a move that, in the words of Chattopadhyay "negated the laboring individual"—and by which socialism was reduced to a mere question of distribution. Lebowitz's rejection of the state form of socialism forms part of his wider reconceptualization of Marx's vision of communism as a "just, people-based alternative." He sees it as a form of socioeconomic organization that removes all obstacles to the full development of human beings, or what he calls "real human development"—in a similar refrain to the humanism identified by Eagleton, Sayers, Chattopadhyay, and me. This rejection of state-socialist models is also expressed by Bertell Ollman (Chapter 4, Volume 1) who posits

that the Soviet Union and China were not evidence of how communism works in practice, not just because of their underdevelopment and constant threat of foreign invasion, but because the regimes of "actually existing socialism" were nothing less than Orwellian constructions. The crucial step in reestablishing Marx's approach to communism, Ollman argues, is to break its connection with these very systems. And yet, in some perverse twist of historical irony, despite the glaring contradictions of these regimes when compared to Marx's express humanistic ideals of communism, they remain the most difficult distortions to correct.

In this context, Silvia Federici (Chapter 8, Volume 1) takes issue with the long-assumed nexus between capitalist development and the eventual liberation of humankind. Federici highlights a number of indelible weaknesses in Marx's reliance on capitalism as somehow necessary for the transition to communism. Such justifications, Federici claims, underestimate the knowledge and wealth produced by noncapitalist societies, just as they underestimate the extent to which capitalism has built its power through their appropriation. They also fail to see how capitalism, far from inventing social cooperation or large-scale intercourse, destroyed societies that had been tied by communal property relations and cooperative forms of work. Moreover, the assumption that capitalism has been inevitable overlooks those in the past who struggled against its imposition, just as it forgets those resisting its machinations in the present. Federici reveals how illusory automation and mechanization have been for human liberation, having not only failed to ease the burden of labor in any meaningful sense but having become parasitic on the earth. Ultimately, such accounts fail to see capitalism as an historical and ongoing process of violent appropriation. Federici claims that capitalism is neither necessary nor progressive in regards to the development of human capacities, but in fact furthers "unequal power relations, hierarchies, and divisions" and generates "ideologies, interests, and subjectivities that constitute a destructive social force." Those accounts that extol a deterministic link between capitalism and communism lead away from the real question of "reconstituting a collective interest" in favor of a productivist and consumerist logic. Ultimately, Federici offers a clear revision of Marxist analysis that contests the notion of capitalism as the necessary precondition for communism, calling for us to instead focus on those social relations that are conducive of human emancipation and the reclamation of the commons rather than a myopic gaze on production, industrialism, and consumption.

It is not that capitalism has achieved nothing, however. Indeed, Marx praised capitalism as generously as Eagleton praises Marx: capitalism has developed human powers of production and furthered a litany of cultural freedoms such as the emancipation of slaves, the invention of human rights, and the dismantling of empires. But the point for Federici—and in distinction to Eagleton's conciliatory, if not optimistic appraisal of

capitalism—is to highlight the epistemological narrowing of what social relations are seen as necessary for the emergence of communist association, against the competitive, asocial logics of capitalism. In other words, what is in contention is how Marx's insistence on the necessity for human freedom of developing productive forces has been subsequently interpreted by Marxists in a one-sided fashion, overlooking the importance of genuine relations of association presupposed in communism. As we shall see, I make similar findings in regards to Marx's attachment to internationalism, which restricts the relations of association under nationalism and the juridical form of the state. For Eagleton however, the question was something different: why, under capitalism, where we have accumulated more resources than throughout proceeding human history and where we labor harder than our ancestors ever did, do we yet remain unable to overcome poverty, exploitation, and inequality? For Eagleton, the answer lies in the way we organize production: capitalism has not, indeed, cannot free us from toil. And it is on this point that Eagleton praises Marx as authentically prophetic: he did not give us blueprints of the future, but made it clear that unless we change our unjust ways, the future is likely to be "deeply unpleasant"—or not at all. This warning is echoed by Lebowitz, who claims that we now risk a new barbarism, a capitalist "endgame," that includes the domination of impoverished peoples and an ecological nightmare.

So what are we to take as the appropriate linkage between capitalism and communism today? For Ollman, the "all too popular separation of Marx's vision of communism from its historical roots in capitalism" must be overcome. That is, communism must be linked, as it was for Marx, to the "unrealized potential" in capitalism. Ollman here makes a major revision of his famous work "Marx's Vision of Communism," claiming that this was based on the wrong question.[15] While utopian speculation can be liberating, Ollman argues that it is no substitute for an analysis of capitalism and the dialectical method of exposition focused on the ways in which Marx looked for evidence of communism inside capitalism: "the future concealed in the present." There are several of these approaches evident within Marx's work, which Ollman offers textual support for throughout his chapter. These include projecting capitalism's major contradictions to the point of their resolution, or, projecting the "end of alienation" through what life would look like under full communism, a device which Marx often used. One of the most important devices however, is the analysis of what Ollman calls the "sprouts" of communism (e.g., cooperatives, unions, and public education) that already exhibit socialist characteristics within the current order.[16] For Ollman, "the new communist world that capitalism has made possible is staring us right in the face." Reestablishing the necessary links between capitalism and communism does not make revolution inevitable, nor render Marx a deterministic thinker.

It makes communism a realistic possibility in the present, regardless of how likely or unlikely this tendency is believed to be. Through these examples, the "end of alienation" can be shown to be not just a normative description of life in "full" communism, but something actually possible, already existing in nascent form. Indeed, for Ollman focusing on the "sprouts" that can, and do, emerge out of the conditions of the present can convincingly reestablish the immanent link through which the oppressed can "leap" into revolutionary practice. In ways very similar to Ollman's idea of the sprouts of communism, Sayers observes that even in late capitalism the communal and cooperative social arrangements, which are the progenitor of communism, are common throughout the existing order and are experienced not just in primary relations of family and friends, but also in those social relations marked by generosity rather than the ideology of self-interest, such as with teachers, nurses, and so on. As such, for both Sayers and Ollman, the alternative forms of social and economic organization—the initial stage in the two-step transition from socialism to communism—already exist in "embryo" in our society. What is perhaps most interesting here is the convergence between Ollman, Sayers, and Federici on the importance of the type of social relations of cooperation and association within communism, which are routinely downplayed in many traditional accounts that emphasize the importance of productive forces.

The question of the link between capitalism and communism usually inheres around interpretations of Marx's statements in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme* and the utility or adequacy of the two-stage thesis about the transition from socialism to true communism.[17] In Volume 1, Sayers, Chattopadhyay, and Lebowtiz offer contending readings of this passage. For example, Sayers argues that in the first stage (the "dictatorship of the proletariat"), the capitalist state is replaced by one that will rule on behalf of working people and through which all private property in the means of production will be converted into common ownership and made operative for the common good. Yet even though ownership is no longer based around private interests, or production attentive to profit, individuals are rewarded according to the work they do so that the notion of wealth remains confined under its bourgeois trappings. This is a critical point that Lebowitz also engages with at length. Sayers reiterates that this is only to be a transitional phase, however, on the way to full or true communism—the place that has transcended and overcome the free market and its notion of profit as value. Only here, under full communism, is productive life brought back under human control and organized for the human good to create a society in which "capital and wage labor, money and the market, classes and the division of labor," are abolished. Chattopadhyay, while denying the centrality of the two-step process, nevertheless shares with Sayers the notion of the change in wealth under communism. Sayers, it

should be recalled, expressed this as the development of needs, which expands human productive and creative powers as value. For Chattopadhyay, the mark of communist society is the change in wealth *from* capital accumulation *to* the expansion of free time for all.

Offering a significant departure from Orthodox Marxism, Lebowitz contests the standard interpretation of the *Gotha Programme* finding that not only does each stage contain strikingly different relations of distribution, but that Marx was not necessarily consistent regarding his depiction of communist society (particularly its economic characteristics). This reading has profound political implications as to whether the socialist principle later identified by Lenin actually corresponded to Marx's conception of the new society—and ultimately explains Lebowitz's rejection of any such state-socialist models of communism.[18] For Lebotwitz, the question hinges on how we are to understand Marx's account of historical development as a process of *becoming.* Capitalism, as an organic system, spontaneously reproduces capitalist conditions and relations of production, that is, it reproduces its necessary premises and "creates its own presuppositions" as a "connected whole" constantly in the process of renewal.[19] Yet no new system can ever produce all its premises so that when a new system emerges it necessarily inherits premises from the old before it can produce its own. Consequently, as socialism emerges from capitalist society, it is, as Marx so famously expressed it, stamped with the "birthmarks" of the old—it is decidedly not communism as developed from its "own foundations." Lebowitz highlights a manifestation of what socialism inherits from capitalism in how it conforms to a particular distribution of property. That is, while the material conditions of production have been transformed into common property in this stage, the "personal condition of production" remains the property of workers. The new system is therefore defective in the sense that it retains explicitly the private ownership of labor-power: fair exchange is the "exchange of equivalents" and socialism comes to be defined by the principle of distribution. The result is that rather than relating to others "as a member of society," the individual producer enters relations as the owner of his or her own capacity. They are seen as a worker, not a human being.[20] It is a one-sided relation. The type of individual produced under such conditions is, of necessity, "deformed by these continuing defects" that will enter *all* social relations. Lebowitz makes clear that this inherited defect of the self-interest of owners in socialism is the opposite of solidarity, community, and association envisaged by Marx and must be actively subordinated if the new society of communism is to develop as an organic system. Yet rather than calling for a struggle to subordinate this defect, Lebowitz finds that those "two-stagers"—like Lenin—seek to transform it into a so-called socialist principle that is to be then enforced by the state. As Lebowitz warns, not struggling against these inherited

defects risks reverting to them. The result is pernicious not just for the deformation of individuals, but also for the very ideal of communism, which is reduced to merely overcoming scarcity and creating consumption without limits—a far cry from the "true realm of freedom" and "real human development" promised by communism, where the development of human powers is to be an end in itself.[21]

These relational deficiencies are also reflected in the restrictions Marx placed on human emancipation through his emphasis on material production over genuine social relations and his reliance on internationalism over wider forms of solidarity required in communist association. In my chapter, I argue that a focus on material production risks subsuming human emancipation under the interests of industrialism, distribution, and consumption, which unwittingly reproduce capitalist relationalities (in ways similar to those identified by Federici and Lebowitz regarding the exchange of equivalents under socialism). Under the productivist dogma of Diamat at the turn of the 20th century, Marxists would forget entirely that the emancipatory promise of communism is not strictly reducible to material production, that the individual under full communism is not to be considered rich because they *have* much, but because they *are* much.[22] Marx's focus on internationalism, I contend, was equally restrictive of the types of social relations necessitated by communist association that he suggested, in the *Communist Manifesto* and in the organizational structure of the First International, were to have global reach. That is, internationalism served to contract the boundaries of ethical community under the state and limit the expression of solidarity in ways that were seemingly at odds with the wider cosmopolitan ethic implied by Marx's concept of human emancipation. Internationalism is logically dependent on the juridical form of the nation-state and some prior ethic of nationalism that limits the potential for universal, collective action. As such, principles of socialist internationalism expressed in the Internationals or world communism, while professing incredibly strong cosmopolitan norms, remain ethically insufficient because of their explicit acceptance of methodological nationalism, the belief that human community is determined by the nation-state. The problem inheres not just with the capture of state power by the vanguard, which threatens the subversion of emancipation under a new ruling class or bureaucracy. It is also bound up with the reliance on the spirit of internationalism that is limited by an underlying commitment to the particularism of the state that may override the type of universal association required by communism.

Along similar lines, Federici calls for us to go "beyond Marx,"[23] not just because of the vast social-economic transformations since the time of his analysis of capitalism, but also because of the limits in his understanding of capitalist relations, which ignored or marginalized subjects from the historical world stage. Marx's focus on wage labor assumed the vanguard

role to the proletariat (usually concentrated in the Western metropolis), downplaying the role of the enslaved, the colonized, and the unwaged, not only in the process of accumulation, extraction of surplus value, and system reproduction, but also in anticapitalist struggles. The absence in Marx's analysis of capitalism of domestic labor, family, and gender relations—and the interest of capital and the state in women's reproductive capacity—is striking. Yet by shifting focus from wage labor to labor power (and its reproduction), Federici hopes to widen Marxist analysis to include gender and the colonial dimensions of late capitalism, which she considers most important for a feminist program and for the politics of the commons. The commons are defined in the plural by Federici (which reflects similar ideas of Teivo Teivainen, Jodi Dean, and David Eden in Volume 3, as we shall see) and because they do not depend for their existence on a supporting state, they do not risk becoming the dictatorship of the white/male sector of the working class within the "concretized" state-form presupposed in the dictatorship of the proletariat. Moreover, Federici finds that struggles in defense of our natural commons and the creation of commoning activities are multiplying in contemporary society[24]—more indications of the embryonic forms of communism within the present identified by Ollman and Sayers—and it is through these actually existing processes that Federici identifies how we can rid ourselves of "all the muck of ages" and liberate ourselves from external constraints and capitalist ideologies.[25]

The primacy given to the commons across the radical Left in recent decades, and articulated clearly in Federici's chapter, interconnects with Lebowitz's theorization of the social changes necessary to realize "our communal nature." Recalling that Lebowitz and Federici both problematize, in their own ways, the supposed necessity between capitalism and communism, for Lebowitz what was necessary to overcome the fixation on distribution as the exchange of equivalents under socialism is a set of institutions and practices through which "all members of society can share the fruits of social labor and are able to satisfy their 'own need for development.'" For him these must include workers, neighbor, and communal councils that extend upward to "transcend the local" and achieve "solidarity within society as a whole"—a call that echoes the cosmopolitan sentiments articulated in my own chapter. Here, Lebowitz cites the socialist triangle of the late Chávez of Venezuela as a means to move toward associated producers as an organic system of production, consumption, and distribution[26]—and many of these communal system processes are documented by Dario Azzelini in Volume 2. For Lebowitz, the socialist triangle offers nothing less than a tripartite expression of "our communal nature": through the social ownership of the means of production comes real social property; through social production for social needs comes worker decision making oriented toward society's needs; through social

production organized by workers and worker decision making comes the transformation of people and their very needs.

These progressive elements of the communal nature of communism are also highlighted by Paul Burkett (Chapter 9, Volume I). Burkett interprets Marx's various outlines of communism as a vision of sustainable human development by sketching the developmental and environmental principles in communal property, production, and relations, that reflect—albeit with differences in terminology—the socialist triangle of production, consumption, and distribution identified by Lebowtiz. Given the worsening crisis of poverty and the environment, Burkett rightly points out that the question of sustainable human development is crucial for the communist tradition, which has long been deemed ecologically unsustainable due to its alleged assumption of a limitless nature and human domination over it. Yet Burkett observes that, for Marx, communal property did not confer a right to overexploit land and other natural conditions for the needs of associated producers[27] but rather was to instill, through communism, "the unity of being of man with nature."[28] Burkett interprets Marx and Engels's references to continued growth of wealth under communism not as an antiecological belief in production for its own sake, but as something that can be properly understood only in relation to their vision of free, well-rounded human development, which we have already explored in the chapters of Eagleton, Sayers, and Chattopadhyay. Human development does not imply limitless growth or the full satiation of all conceivable needs, but rather the "satiation of basic needs and a gradual extension of this satiation to secondary needs as they develop socially through expanded free time and cooperative worker-community." The fact that production under communism is a broad social process in which wealth and use value is increasingly defined by "free time" or "disposal time" (something Chattopadhyay also reflects on), then takes on tremendous ecological significance. As opposed to the use value of profit under capitalism that licenses the destructive exploitation of the environment, Burkett highlights the environmental dimensions of communism that tends toward the deepening or enrichment of "human–nature relations." In particular, against those who equate the expansion of free time under communism with the overcoming of all natural constraints, Burkett shows how communism allows for the responsible management of the use of natural conditions, and, through the expansion of free time as a measure of wealth, has the potential to reduce pressures on limited natural conditions.

These progressive dimensions of communism are taken further by Roger Paden (Chapter 7, Volume 1) who reexamines the relation between utopian thinking, communism, and the normativity of urban planning. Paden examines five different strands of Marx and Engels's criticism of inadequate forms of utopianism—tactical, strategic, materialist, humanist,

and historicist—finding that their professed "anti-utopian utopianism" was not paradoxical but directed specifically against *static* utopias, that is, those utopian forms that sought to arrest historical development by restricting the right of future generations to adopt principles different from those that shaped their social institutions (a view that bares similarities to Kier Milburn's account of the valorization of ongoing rebellion in Jefferson and Hardt discussed in Chapter 9, Volume 3). In fact, far from being opposed to utopianism, Paden finds Marx and Engels to be "utopians of a very special sort," for instance, counting the Utopian Socialists among "the most significant minds of all time."[29] Paden assures us that a utopianism that emphasizes the importance of human development, egalitarian dialogue, and urban forms that facilitate processes of association would be approved of by Marx and Engels. This is because in distinction to the static utopian projects of Saint Simon, Owen, and Fourier, Marx and Engels advanced a form of utopianism justified on the human need for conscious self-development (humanism) and the need for the discursive development of moral categories (historicism). For Paden, these justifications point toward what he identifies as a "developmentalist utopia" and a "procedural dialectic utopia," respectively, within Marx's vision of communism. Yet more than any other chapter of Volume 1, Paden extends Marx's vision by using these humanist and historicist justifications of utopianism for a constructive contribution to the types of social processes a Marxist urban planner should facilitate. While Paden admits that the best urban design cannot produce the utopian society of Marx's vision, in the absence of social revolution, they can nevertheless contribute to human progress and improve the lives of the living. Indeed, such processes could mirror what urban planning in communist society *could* be, that is, "the science and art of catalyzing and nourishing the close-grained working relationships"[30] required for human emancipation.

In ways that complement Paden's account of the utopian dimensions of Marx's thought, Michael Löwy (Chapter 10, Volume 1) contends that there are substantial affinities between Marxism and Romanticism, which are too often neglected in deference to their association with French socialism, German philosophy, and British political economy. Löwy demonstrates how romanticism is fundamental to two of most fundamental aspects of Marx's thought, namely, his critique of capitalism and his conception of communism. Yet Löwy does not characterize Marx as a Romantic, but rather posits that he accepted the Romantic viewpoint of the plenitude of the precapitalist past and its critique of the bourgeois world, while rejecting both Romanticism's illusion of a return to the past and the bourgeois apology of the present. So while the reactionary pole of romanticism dreamt of Utopias of return, and the revolutionary pole attempted to detour the past toward an emancipated future, Löwy shows that Marx and Engels recognized the value of the social critique that the Romantic tradition

contributed, namely, their denunciation of the "bourgeois destruction of all human qualities, transformed into commodities, and the ruthless exploitation of the workers." Yet, Marx and Engels's debt to Romanticism goes deeper than the critique of modern bourgeois civilization. Löwy goes on to show how Marx and Engels's conception of a communism that would reestablish the role of the "human and natural qualities" of life—a reference to precapitalist forms of production and of life—is a clear link to the Romantic tradition. Simultaneously, however, communism was also a *new* way of life in the process and relations of production, a new social culture. Communism was therefore neither Romantic nor Modernist but "an attempt at a dialectical *Aufhebung* [sublation] between the two, in a new critical and revolutionary worldview . . . one that would incorporate the technological advances of modern society along with some of the human qualities of precapitalist communities." In this way, communism did not commit the same follies as reactionary dreams of return but was to be a "detour by the past towards the communist future."

Volume 2: Whither Communism?

Moving on from Marx's projections of the communist future and the theoretical concerns of Volume 1, Volume 2 *Whither Communism?* explores the challenges of communism, both past and present. This involves engaging with a number of historical ruptures in the radical Left that continue to resonate in the communist present. This is followed by accounts of the many ongoing state-socialist projects, China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, more recent developments in Mexico and Venezuela, and an assessment of the existent potentialities of radical working-class socialism at the start of the 21st century. Given the vast differences that arise from the distinct historical content or country-specific analysis of each chapter in Volume 2, it is impossible to draw out any commonalities, though it remains pertinent to offer an account of the main arguments of each chapter.

The volume opens to Robert Graham's (Chapter 1, Volume 2) reengagement with the historical disagreements between the anarchists and Marxists, with a particular focus on the debates between Marx and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and Marx and Mikhail Bakunin. Despite the divergence on the questions of historical materialism, state power, and the role of the proletariat—all of which continue today—Graham finds that there was broad agreement between Marx and Proudhon on the foundational question of the abolishing the state along with the abolition of capitalism. Nevertheless, what was keenly disputed was the best method and organization to bring about these social, economic, and political transformations. Anarchists argued that the organization of the workers into a class need not result in the creation of a workers' party, nor that a single political party could ever claim to speak for the entire working class. Moreover,

anarchists contested Marx's belief that state ownership and control of the means of production would abolish class antagonism and advocated instead for self-management—an idea of collectivity that was to be operated and managed directly by those involved—which became a dominant theme in anarchist proposals for social change. On the other hand, Marx contended with Proudhon's mutualism, arguing that any socialist economic system that retained "individual exchange" would be a class system.[31] On this point, Graham finds that some anarchists moved toward the communist position, particularly within the First International, but not on the basis of Marx's theory of historical materialism but through the rejection of Proudhon's mutualist economics, his insufficiently revolutionarily program, and his waning commitment to anarchism. Bakunin, on the other hand, advocated a collectivist position. He disagreed with those revolutionaries who, like Marx, favored a centralized revolutionary state, arguing that "no dictatorship can have any other objective than to perpetuate itself" and that it "would inevitably result in military dictatorship and a new master."[32] As opposed to the Marxian currents in the International, which sought the revolutionary overthrow and capture of state power, Bakunin's proto-syndicalism looked for its replacement through councils of trade bodies and a committee of delegates. These would take the place of politics to create the "free federation of free producers."[33] For Bakunin, it was only through the self-activity of the masses that an anarchist society could be achieved.

The tragedy of the Paris Commune brought these issues to a head. The tide of reaction that swept across Europe strengthened Marx's resolve regarding the need for distinct working-class political parties; for the anarchists, it affirmed the need for militant trade union organization. Yet from the mid-1870s to the early 1880s, there was a convergence between some anarchist and Marxist currents toward libertarian or anarchist communism that resulted (on the anarchist side) from an internal critique of its earlier expressions of anarchist socialism. For Graham, there are now more similarities between these so-called class struggle anarchists and council communists than there are between those anarchist currents that emphasize process, assembly forms of organization (such as the 2011 Occupy movements, discussed by Rodrigo Nunes and Kier Milburn in Volume 3) and the creation of a decentralized ecological society. At the same time, it seems that some rapprochement between these two revolutionary strands of socialism is now possible given the failures of state socialism, the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the modern state, and the need for direct forms of self-organization at local and cosmopolitan levels. One can hear echoed in Graham's account the slogan that "the revolution will be free, or not at all."

Paul Blackledge (Chapter 2, Volume 2) continues the historical examination of communism by interrogating the failings of the Internationals in

promoting working-class solidarity, leading to the outbreak of World War I. Premised around the limitations of the Second International, Blackledge outlines Lenin's condemnation of its "opportunism," which "betrayed" the working class,[34] and argues that Lenin's approach to politics has lost none of its pertinence for communism in the 21st century. For Blackledge, the revolutionary Left's lack of proposals to stop World War I can be explained by the way it had become enmeshed within what were de facto reformist organizations and revisionist ideas. The Second International had largely forgotten Marx's focus on "human society, or social humanity,"[35] instead—as Rosa Luxembourg had already observed—tending to view socialism as the "inevitable" outcome of the contradictions of capitalism.[36] Yet Lenin's reading of Hegel offered a powerful alternative to positivist, neo-Kantian and Hegelian theorists of the Second International, by suggesting that humankind's consciousness did not merely reflect the world but *created* it.[37] By renewing the sublation of materialism and idealism that Marx articulated in the 1840s, Lenin was able to raise a devastating criticism of the Second International and the tendency of socialist parties to "cover political passivity beneath radical rhetoric."

In distinction to Kautsky and Bernstein's fatalistic reification of Marxism, Blackledge claims that Lenin understood that subjective practical activity lay at the center of the objective world, holding that social scientific laws should not be fetishized as things distinct from conscious human activity, but instead be recognized as necessarily "narrow, incomplete, [and] approximate" attempts to frame political intervention.[38] It was the specific historical form of capitalism, for Lenin, that created the potential for political action toward the concrete possibility for workers' power in the metropolis, in alliance with national liberation movements in the colonies. For Blackledge, Lenin's use of the terms "betrayal" (in 1914) and "helplessness" (in 1922) to describe international socialism's inability to stop war is best regarded as a call to maximize the effectiveness of the Left, to focus on those things that it could achieve, with a view to building its influence *before* challenging power. Yet, Lenin's ideas were to be rejected within the communist (Third) International in favor of a return to a variant of Second International orthodoxy. The Stalinist deformation of the Soviet Union disassociated the leadership and bureaucracy from the interests of the proletariat in favor of the interests of the Soviet ruling class. These were the specific tyrannies the anarchists foresaw in the attempt to capture state power by representatives or vanguards of the working class, as identified in Graham's chapter.

Building from these antecedents to the Soviet experiment, Catherine Samary (Chapter 3, Volume 2) presents both an historical and contemporary account of the capitalist restoration throughout Eastern Europe, following the demise of the Soviet Union. Despite the many (failed) promises of economic development and civil freedoms that were to follow the

introduction of Western capitalism, this process has been attended by a loss of social and economic protections for these subject populations. According to the World Bank and UNICEF, Russia now ranks among one of the most unequal countries in the world, its poverty levels rising from 1/25 in 1988 to 1/5 in 1998, and its life expectancy declining sharply (as high as 6.3 years for men).[39] Samary demonstrates how the histories of Eastern Europe have suffered ongoing conflicting national and ideological distortions, including the "official history" after the Stalinization of Soviet Union, but also the relations of domination between the Western European core and the semiperipheralization of Eastern European states that continues today. Most disconcerting however has been the loss or deliberate ambiguation of the 1989 movement's anti-bureaucratic dimensions in favor of portraying them solely as anticommunist.

Sammary views the post-1989 changes throughout Eastern Europe as "*refo*lution,"[40] that is, changes combining features of revolutions (systemic transformations) and reforms (changes introduced from above). Yet, whereas much has been made of those aspects that introduced political pluralism, elections and new laws that radically transformed the economy and the state, the other tendency in the spirit of 1989 have been neglected, namely, the desire to hold onto the social contract of the Soviet system, which assured employment, access to basic goods and services, and living conditions. For Samary, any consistent interpretation of 1989 must include both the anticommunist and the anti-bureaucratic dimensions of this movement—the latter of which had long-standing precedents within the conflicting logics of Real Socialism, such as the reforms in Czechoslovakia (1962 and 1968), or in Yugoslavia (1965). One must go behind the ideological discourses of the 1989 democratic revolutions to see how the United States was able to win Solidarność to a liberal as opposed to proworkerist, ideology, or how a broad part of the former state apparatus was transformed, through the invention of privatizations, into an emergent bourgeoisie to become the oligarchs of today's Russia and elsewhere. The introduction of neoliberalism—and its benchmarks of elections and privatization—was presented as an answer to the former Soviet dictatorship, but without full knowledge of the economic program that would remove the fundamental aspects of the social contract inherent to state socialism. What the peoples of Eastern Europe really sought, claims Samary, was the retention of the social contract and the obtainment of civil freedom, while getting rid of the bureaucratic and parasitic class.

The rise of the People's Republic of China runs in complete contradistinction to the collapse of the Soviet Union as described by Samary. While the question of whether China equates to a communist state—a question that could be asked about any of the statist projects of the last century, as Lebowitz, Chattopadhyay, and others noted in Volume 1—Alexander Vuving (Chapter 4, Volume 2) affirms that China will "most likely" be

the new superpower. Vuving claims that Chinese communism was born of the dream that China would one day regain its lost power and status. Yet largely foregoing engagement with such normative political and social commentary, Vuving offers an economically driven analysis of the developments contributing to the rise of the "Red Dragon." In terms of the main indicators of power—gross domestic product (GDP) and military expenditure—China is second only to the United States.[41] Furthermore, China has been experiencing super-high growth due to its ability to maintain super-high investment and super-low consumption. Yet alongside these persuasive indicators of China becoming a "peer competitor" to the United States, Vuving identifies a curious dialectic in Chinese development, claiming that its success "also bears the seeds of its failure." The problem is that the same growth model that has catapulted Chinese development will likely collapse rather than be restructured to become sustainable. Vuving demonstrates that China's rise has been premised on sources that will not last for ever: its ability to save and invest, the so-called cult of investment, has been pursued at the expense of personal consumption; its massive allocations of labor from agriculture to manufacturing and services, and from the state to the nonstate sector, relies on a pool of surplus labor from rural areas that is likely to dry up, causing a rise in wages and increasing costs of labor. This will ultimately make the country's products less price competitive. Added to these issues are the social pressures attending the growing gulf between rich and poor, which in Vuving's estimation portend "the eventual outburst of social and economic turmoil." China's growth model is, in a word, unsustainable. When these sources of cheap labor, capital, and technology are exhausted, China will experience the natural end of its high-growth phase. Here, the ability to innovate will be key; yet Vuving suggests that the same structures that have allowed China to rise may render it resistant to moving toward a more sustainable form of growth.

In stark contrast to the rise of China that many now see as inevitable, the longevity of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has continued to confound the many observers who persistently suggest the likelihood of its imminent collapse. Yet for Bruce Cummings (Chapter 5, Volume 2), history has consistently failed to bare out these predictions because observers fail to engage with the nature of a North Korean political system that has survived because it has diverged so fundamentally from Marxism-Leninism, turning to an older political culture of corporatism, a philosophy of neo-Confucianism, and a modern form of dynastic monarchism. Cummings contends with the typical view that the DPRK has survived only because of China's diplomatic and trade assistance, suggesting that what distinguishes North Korean survival is the commitment of its "octogenarian officers" of the civil war to prevent their place in history from being erased, which might well be the case if the North were to ever

capitulate to the South. In a culture that treats history and genealogy with the utmost seriousness, being consigned to historical irrelevance or, even worse, erasure, is tantamount to losing connection with one's ancestors and progeny. This is an outcome "to be resisted at all costs."

In addition to these cultural resources, the political form of the DPRK possesses a number of stabilizing features, albeit peculiar and even abhorrent to Western sentiment. Cummings likens the ideology of Kim Il Sung to a form of socialist corporatism, one in which the nation substituted the proletarian class as the unit of historical conflict and in which organic and familial metaphors, of blood, of the fatherly leader were emphasized. Cummings gives significance to the real meaning of *chuch'e* (Kim's trumpeted "Juche idea") that he argues is best translated as "to put things Korean first, always." The term is far more than self-reliance and independence however, for when coupled with the word for nation—*kukch'e*—it evokes an incredibly strong form of nationalism and national dignity. While "Juche" began as a form of anticolonial nationalism it has slowly evolved into an idealist metaphysic that has more in common with the exaltations of neo-Confucianism than Marxism. With an understanding of these politico-cultural norms, Cummings finds that the North Korean system has its own logic, however idiosyncratic it may appear, through which it becomes easier to understand the regime's behavior "as an unusual but predictable combination of monarchy, anti-imperial nationalism, and Korean political culture." On this basis, Cummings contends that North Korea is unlikely to collapse precisely because of its modern monarchical form, which has already progressed through two stable successions. The proof was manifested in the symbolism of Kim Jong Il's funeral procession that confirmed three generations of rulership. Here, the appearance of Jong Un was a spitting image of his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, when he came to power in the late 1940s, even to the detail of having the same iconic sideburns shaved up high. Amid such ritualism, it is little wonder that ordinary Koreans often call their leader *wang* (king). While Marx would shudder to hear this monarchy being associated with communism, Cummings points out that DPRK is a modern form of monarchy—born of the resistance to Japanese imperialism and the historical narrative that the regime has chosen to engineer around this—a monarchy realized in a highly nationalist and postcolonial state, and one likely to be around well into the 21st century.

The changes within Vietnam as it grapples with the challenges of modernity and development contrast sharply to with the dynastic monarchy in North Korea. Thaveeporn Vasavakul (Chapter 6, Volume 2) provides an analysis of the transformations within Vietnamese socialism since 1975, highlighting not only how the state was redefined but how intrastate and state–citizen relations were also reconfigured. Attempting to adopt good practices of development, the Leninist regime has amended

its basic principles of state socialism, including property rights, state ownership of the means of production, central planning, and one-party rule. Economically, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) originally followed a mixed model drawn from the Soviet Union and China, and while there was a considerable degree of institutional adaptation, central planning and state control of the means of production were predominant. Politically, the socialist state system consisted of four basic components: the party, the state, the National Assembly, and mass organizations. Yet between 1979 and 1988 a number of policies amended these significantly. The Sixth Plenum of the Fourth Congress in 1979 endorsed a free market to operate within the planned economy and while subsequent reforms were partial toward a multisector commodity economy, they were confirmed in 1986 by the official launch of *doi moi,* the de-collectivization of rural Vietnam and the abolishment of the two-price system in 1989.[42] *Doi moi* also institutionalized the reconfiguration of the one-party state, redefining party control over the government and strengthening state management capacities. For Vasavakul, this has brought about a related set of political changes, including the rise of a strong executive, a state role in business and service delivery, and the enhancement of democratic space (including elected bodies, popular organizations, direct citizen participation, and public accountability). At the same time, however, the state has become a large marketplace where exploitation takes place. Moreover, under the new market system, the working class has become socially fragmented; the peasantry has gained economically but has been weakened politically; and the system has turned cooperative members into individual and independent producers.

The question for Vietnam is how to institutionalize socialist ideals within this new order. Vasavakul speculates on a number of possibilities. Firstly, Vietnam's current governance reforms, post-central planning, offer distinct possibilities for addressing the interests of increasingly marginalized groups (specifically the peasantry, working class, and women) over the power of enterprise managers, in order to contribute to "balancing growth with equality." Secondly, socialist ideals could be made concrete through the reform of state institutions and the improvement of public services (particularly education and health care). Thirdly, Vasavakul looks to the development of socialist democratic spaces, particularly increased roles for popular organizations and the development of grassroots democracy, which may bring about a better quality of governance. Finally, socialist ideals may reemerge as Vietnam rethinks post-central planning ideological and cultural values that had turned away from the egalitarianism and anti-exploitation ideology of the DRV during the war of national liberation, to one of political patronage networks under *doi moi.* Vasavakul contends that while the ideology of the *doi moi* has birthed many exploitative practices, it does not rule out the emergence of alternative political

values that could emphasize the rule of law, meritocracy, and transparency, among others—all of which would offer innovative contributions to the history of Marxism-Leninism and an affirmation of the socialist ideals of Vietnam's revolutionary past.

Moving from Asia to Central America, Bruno Bosteels (Chapter 7, Volume 2) follows the Mexican Commune across the revolutionary history of this country—in Mexico City (1874–77), Morelos (1914–15), Chiapas (1994), and Oaxaca (2006)—observing that from generation to generation, this "utopian ideal" returns again and again, claiming that even the divergent paths of anarchism and socialism have found common ground in the many resurrections of the commune in Mexico. Bosteels observes that it is the politically open, or what Marx called the "expansive," form of the commune[43] that could create a temporary zone of "indistinction" between socialism and anarchism, even today. The Morelos Commune of 1914, when Zapata and his troops retreated from Mexico City, was an experiment in self-government and created an egalitarian society with communal roots in their home territory that combined military and administrative control of the villages with radical agrarian reforms. This potential for local self-rule and autonomy continued in what Bosteels describes as "a creative attempt at local self-government based on long-standing traditions of communal decision making and consultation from below" that started with the indigenous revolts of the 1970s and 1980s, culminating in 1994 with what many describe as the Commune in Chiapas.[44] In addition, in 2006, the brutal repression of the annual teachers' strike sparked the creation of a democratic structure for self-governance, the Popular Assembly of the Oaxacan Peoples (APPO), a nascent commune that challenged the clientelism and corruption of the Mexican state. These examples demonstrate, for Bosteels, that the potential for local self-rule through the commune is not lost. Nevertheless, there have been deep transformations of the commune throughout this history, and Bosteel's identifies two major inflections of the Mexican Commune: on the one hand, the Marxist-Leninist form, derived from the 1871 Paris Commune, and on the other, an indigenous-subalternist form, focused on the originary community that has trends toward horizontal, non-hierarchical, and autonomous forms of self-organization and which Bosteel's claims has restored the commune to its traditional, peasant and agrarian roots. There are clear overlaps here with Graham's description of the processual currents in contemporary anarchism that emphasize assembly, decentralization, and ecologism in the opening chapter of Volume 2. Yet despite the seeming bifurcation between the Marxist-Leninist and indigenous-subalternist forms of the commune, Bosteels argues that it still offers a "precarious meeting ground" and "tenuous common ground" in which resides the possibility for other "resurrections" of the commune in Mexico.

This optimistic reading of the future possibilities for the Left continues in Sandra Rein's (Chapter 8, Volume 2) imaginings on the "future(s)" potentially open to Cuban society in the post-Castro era. Rein examines the foundations of the 1959 Revolution, finding that the ongoing strength of Cuban social solidarity is based around the nationalist sentiment of the early revolutionary regime, containing both Che Guevara's call for the "new socialist man" and Castro's construction of the nationalist project. This has generated what she calls "strong communities" within Cuba, where the success of one is dependent on the success of all and which, she hopes, may challenge the path dependency of neoliberal capitalism and enter Cuba into its most revolutionary phase. It is important to note here that Rein's account of essential place of social relations in the strength of communist Cuba reflects some of the themes drawn out in Lebowtiz, Federici, and my own chapter in Volume 1.

Based on the three important features of the Cuban state consolidated after the Bay of Pigs invasion—the state capitalist economy, the concentration of political power in the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and the realization of socialist *conciencia* amongst the population—Rein's analysis traces three possibilities for Cuba after the Castros. The first envisages a "managed transition." The Cuban regime is already engaged with this process, given the transfer of power from Fidel to Raúl. However, this transition will have to deal with a set of related crises, not just economic but around political participation, civil freedoms (including addressing sexism, homophobia, and racism), the aging demographic, growing inequality, and unemployment. Here, the centralized control of the FAR, whose leadership is increasingly vested with private interests, and the looming economic power of the United States, exists alongside the tendency for foreign capital to reintegrate Cuba into global capitalist networks where the old revolutionary values are unlikely to survive. The second possibility is a "forced and sudden transition" following the death of the Castro's and the likely succession of FAR officers. Here, the inefficiency of the economy and inability of the state to ensure a basic standard of living may result in the obtainment of International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans and externally mandated restructuring. Ultimately, this scenario portends "massive social dislocation, the loss of core social services, and an unclear political structure." The final scenario sees Cuba seizing its most revolutionary moment, forcing the revolution to live up to its initial promise, far beyond the scope of its nationalist trappings of 1959. This, Rein believes, could open the possibility for rethinking what a socialist revolution can mean in the 21st century.

The contemporary transformations of the aging revolutionary regime in Cuba are vastly different from the new and novel experiments with socialism currently underway in Venezuela. Based on his extensive field research, Dario Azzellini (Chapter 9, Volume 2), explores the practices of

the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela with a particular account of the construction of communal production and consumption under the control of workers and communities.[45] Here, the transition to socialism is envisioned as combining local self administration and workers' control of the means of production—elements that Azzellini suggests may lead to a communal state by unleashing the creative capacities that reside collectively. The question is whether the state can overcome or suppress its structurally inherent logic of control to accept such movements "from below." On this point, Azzellini finds that on a number of fundamental levels the Bolivarian process is acting as a permanent creative collective force of the people (constituent power) that is effectively imposing itself on constituted power (the political authorities). This bottom-up approach of local self-administration—of communal councils, communes, and communal cities—has expanded direct and participatory democratic forms considerably. In addition, many initiatives—including Empresas de Propiedad Social Directa Comunal, (EPSDC), Socialist Workers' Councils (CST), Movimiento de Pobladores (MDP), Red Nacional de Comuneros y Comuneras (RNC), and Comités de Tierra Urbana (CTU)—have sought to democratize crucial aspects of property, work, and production. Indeed, the latter two groups (the RNC and CTU), while initiated by the state, are now autonomous. Such movements of self-government through the organization of councils have made huge advances throughout Venezuela and give credence to Azzellini's argument that such communal councils, communes, and communal cities may gradually supplant the bourgeois state. At the very least, they confirm Azzellini's assertion that, following Antonio Negri, the Bolivarian process is not about taking state power but about creation and invention:[46] an active process fostering the capacities of the community and workers "to analyze, decide, implement, and evaluate what is relevant to their lives."

David Camfield (Chapter 10, Volume 2) closes Volume 2 with a historically contextualized account of radical working-class socialist parties and movements in the early 21st century. The seeming weakness of these groups contrasts sharply with the strength of the radical Left in the previous two centuries, which Graham and Blackledge emphasized at the beginning of the volume. Camfield focuses on one distinct political current of communist lineage: radical working-class socialism, defined by its identification of mass working-class struggle and revolution, as the path to communism; the belief in taking political power and the rejection of both reformism and small radical minorities (i.e., conspiratorial insurrectionism). The bulk of the chapter documents these radical working-class socialist organizations, which currently exist in Asia, South America, Europe, and elsewhere. Significantly, Camfield finds that radical working-class socialist groups and parties are relatively weak, despite the GFC and the rise of anti-capitalist movements since the mid-1990s.

Camfield explains that a combination of factors has lead to this relative weakness, including how neoliberalism has produced a general crisis of politics; the collapse of USSR and its impact on the ideological basis of these groups; the decline of the political force of the working class since the mid-1970s; and specific characteristics of radical working-class socialism, including the marginal status and size of its existing forces, its fragmentation, and its seeming inability to engage in practical collaboration. The global resistance movements against neoliberal orthodoxy—including the international anti-/alter-globalization movements and formation of the WSFs—all of which are anti-capitalist[47] have not brought with them any resurgence in radical working-class socialism. For Camfield, if there is some resurgence in radical working-class socialism, which on the basis of his evidence seems highly unlikely, its language and political culture will be "dramatically different" from those of today.

Volume 3: The Future of Communism

The closing volume, Volume 3, *The Future of Communism,* follows the trajectory of communist ideas, and particularly the possibilities for emancipatory change, into the 21st century. Yet, like the previous volume, it is difficult to account for any thematic commonalities given the vast differences in subject matter that each chapter addresses. From the GFC, the Arab Spring, Occupy, and the WSF, to the problems of value, the commons, and digital technology; from theoretical engagements with feminism and critical theory, to new forms of organization, assembly, militancy, and communizing, Volume 3 offers an array of engagements that cannot be meshed together as one coherent narrative. Despite this, what emerges is an openness to, and construction of, new theoretical and practical dimensions of communism that accord with the humanistic and relational vision of communism at the heart of Marx's thought, but with the sublation of Orthodox forms of communist practice focused on the state and economism, toward open and participatory methods.

Given the ongoing financial stagnation since the 2007 GFC, and the lack of any substantive changes in banking and finance markets, Massimo De Angelis (Chapter 1, Volume 3) offers a timely examination of the causes of recurrent capitalist crisis. Outlining the dynamics of the last 30 years, De Angelis demonstrates the rise of neoliberalism and its responsibility for this crisis, which he claims should be seen not as purely economic but "a capitalist crisis of social stability" in which capitalism "has reached an impasse." The question is whether capitalism can renew itself, breaking the impasse on its own terms, or, whether another social force can bring about social cooperation and create a "new world." De Angelis discusses four plans that could be deployed to meet this crisis. The first, Neoliberalsm Plus, seeks to "coagulate" social cooperation around the need of

capital accumulation, with society functioning to support and promote markets. The second, Keynesianism Plus, seeks to coagulate social cooperation around the need of capital accumulation through the triple attractors of markets, states, and civil society. The third, Exclusion/Emergency and Fascism, seeks to coagulate social cooperation around the greatness of a nation, ethnic group, or a community in close organic connection to a hierarchical state that uses force against any form of "otherness." The final plan, Commons and Democracy, seeks to coagulate social cooperation around the expansion and integration of alternative modes of social cooperation based on shared resources and what De Angelis calls "horizontal government," where communities themselves pursue the explicit goals of social justice, freedom, and emancipation. This last plan, clearly favored by De Angelis, combines direct democratic processes that make possible the communalization of property and the actualization of particular resources as a commons. That is, both democracy and the commons are mutually related, or as De Angelis explains "two sides of the same coin" for it is only "deep democratic" forms—institutions of the commons—that can ensure the sustainability of reproduction, both socially and ecologically, upon which all forms of social organization ultimately depend.

Continuing with the creation of viable futures for human society, Teivo Teivainen (Chapter 2, Volume 3) explores the WSF as an avenue for global, postcapitalist alternatives as reflected in its pioneering slogan, "another world is possible." However, Teivainen prefers the term "commonism" to describe these potentialities that connect with historical socialist and communist ideals, but which are distinguished by the WSF's global scope, as opposed to the state socialist projects of the past. The aim here is to remove the WSF's nonstate-centric attempts at "commons-based democratic alternatives" from any connotations with Soviet-style authoritarianism. Teivainen describes the main forums and myriad local and thematic events that have developed since the first forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil, 2001, but his primary concern is in detailing the various historical processes—particularly the transnational connectivity of Brazilian social movements—that led to the emergence of the WSF. For Teivainen, the role of the Brazilian Workers' Party PT (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*) was crucial, specifically its antivanguardist inclinations and its ideological justification for a broad, inclusive coalitions of Marxist and social democratic elements, which inspired the construction of the WSF as a "coming-together of diverse groups."[48] These ideological and organizational boundaries were codified in a Charter of Principles that combined the notion of the WSF as a space and as movement-oriented.[49] Nevertheless, it is not open to all movements, restricting the direct participation of political parties, which, it is widely believed, may cause undesirable struggles for representation. It also prohibits military

organizations. Both exclusions have been criticized as hypocritical, the former because of PT's foundational involvement in the WSF and the latter that has strictly excluded armed civil society but whose relation to armed states has been far more ambiguous.

Nevertheless, Teivainen argues that the WSF's opposition to neoliberalism, the domination of capital or imperialism, and, most of all, its commitment to the idea of open space can be defined as a radically democratic ideology, a move from globalization's protests toward "global democratization." Here, the avoidance of statist strategies and logics of representation, of giving more strategic weight to a struggle or identity over others, does not mean the total absence of structure. For the open space method of the forums and autonomist nonstate conceptions of the commons, while germane to local settings, is difficult to mobilize transnationally. The WSF is then caught in a tension between nonstate "commonist" leanings and state-centric realities. For this reason, Teivainen sees the WSF as an "important example of the attempts to create a democratic world through democratic means" while "creating the conditions for learning, networking, and organizing between social movements in relatively transnational and global contexts."

Against the dynamism and optimism of the WSF, the crisis in Syria is a stark reminder of the failures, confusion, and ineptitude of the international left in confronting tyranny. Firas Massouh (Chapter 3, Volume 3) interrogates why the Syrian Revolution is yet to receive effective support, despite the youth of Syria's call for social change, equality, dignity, and freedom, which was expected to rally the Left, who had supported the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions on similar grounds. The case is tragic and farcical, yet symptomatic of an influential current in international leftist politics, which Massouh believes clings to anti-imperialism and thereby lends support to despotic regimes on the pretext of giving priority to the national question. Massouh finds that the Assad regime has exploited Left parties internally, while painting events in Syria as an imperialistic plot externally. This narrative is accepted by segments of the international Left—Assad's "useful idiots," as Hill derides them.[50] The nature of the conflict is also misconstrued by the mainstream media as sectarian, Islamic, and serving terrorism, which serves only to confirm the regime's narrative that there was never a genuine revolution, but merely a sectarian insurgency of Sunni Islamist militants aiming to destabilize Syrian sovereignty. At the same time, the Left's commitment to the narrative of geopolitical conspiracies about U.S.-led interventions misses out on "the bigger picture" that the conflict is a "revolt against injustice, repression, and censorship."[51] Taken together, these issues have the undesirable consequence of rendering political Islam a far more coherent opposition to the Assad regime, allowing it to usurp the revolutionary

leadership. Yet as Massouh questions, along with Slavoj Žižek, Islamo-Fascism is primarily "the result of the left's failure, but simultaneously proof that there was a revolutionary potential, a dissatisfaction, which the left was not able to mobilize."[52]

There is a tendency to reduce the debate around Syria to the question of minorities—the Sunni Muslims against the rest—something Massouh avoids by showing that Sunnis are not exclusively anti-regime. Indeed, the Sunni merchant class continues to work hand in hand with the regime. Nevertheless, through an engagement with the nuances of Syrian society, Massouh demonstrates how the Sunni contention under the Assad regime expresses broader pattern of state–society and class relations in modern Syria. For Massouh, Assad has been able to propagate the idea that the most threatening force is the Sunnis, who are depicted or constructed as "rural," "uneducated," "backward," "outside," the "unhomely," the "street persons." In all of these ways, society's discontents in Assad's Syria have been projected on the Sunnis. Massouh argues that the Left needs to see how the regime's discrimination and exploitation of the peasantry and working classes—represented mainly by Sunnis—is in essence a "biopolitical endgame," articulated in sectarian terms, that preys on the secular Left's (and the West's) fear of Islamo-Fascism. In these ways, classic notions of class struggle and anti-imperialism are insufficient for understanding the Syrian Revolution, or helping it.

The theme of contemporary revolutionary struggle is also taken up by Dave Eden (Chapter 4, Volume 3), who posits that the question informing our historical juncture—and one that echoes radical debates of the past—is whether or not to make demands; that is, whether we can win victories in the context of capitalism or whether this sacrifices "communisation." For some, the very absence of demands is a mark of a struggle's radicalism, proof of the creation of radical subjectivities moving beyond the boundaries of capitalist social relations. Yet a third option is also identified by Eden: Italian post-workerism, based on a politics of the common. In this tradition, demands of the here and now are deemed possible, valuable, and able to lead to radical social transformation. Core demands relate to general social income and participatory democracy, global citizenship, and open access to the common.[53] It is not a statist project. Rather, it is about increasing power to win profound changes in how society is organized. Here, the formation of assemblies in recent protests and revolutionary moments, and the demand of maintaining a decent life with dignity, point toward the possibility of the post-workerist vision.

Yet as Eden demonstrates, the question of whether or not to make demands is actually a manifestation of the contradictory nature of the working class—as variable capital and as the proletariat. And on this basis, Eden claims, the post-workerists misunderstand what is radical in the condition of labor and thus how we get "from this society to another

one." For them, labor is seen as autonomous, and capital as a form of capture and command that imposes itself on this autonomous project. There is just "the common" for, or beyond, capital. Yet Eden claims that value is the social existence that wealth takes in capitalism, due to the commodification of human creativity, the organization of social cooperation through monetary exchange, and the split between producers and between labor and capital.[54] Eden turns to Marx's distinction between concrete labor and abstract labor, in a similar refrain to John Holloway at the end of Volume 3,[55] which reveals the real antagonism between creativity as a living potential and capital as the endless accumulation of value. The limitation of the post-workerist position is that their notion of struggles remains the struggle of abstract labor; that is, "struggles of the working class as struggles within capitalism" so that their "call for demands remain firmly within capitalist logics." This recalls, in certain respects, Lebowitz's claims in Volume 1 regarding the limits of the socialist principle that would reduce communism to distribution. The point for Eden is to go beyond the reformist expression of social struggle, to move from these moments that are "largely contained and normalized, into the creation of a force, a movement, and the production of a different world . . . and to develop forms of organization and commons that arise from these moments." Eden sees then a "world full of proletarian possibilities," but a world which requires a return to the investigation of our conditions and, consequently, "solidarity, defiance, autonomy and unity of the class." The point here is not to merely contest the conditions of sale or reproduction of capital, but to "question the existence of this relation itself"—something that speaks directly to the importance of social relations of communism in the 21st century.

Also addressing the theme of the commons pronounced in Eden's chapter, Jodi Dean (Chapter 5, Volume 3) illuminates how "the common" and "the commons" involves processes of exploitation and expropriation specific to what she calls "communicative capitalism"—the convergence of capitalism and democracy through networked media—offering both new experiences of collectivity and barriers to their politicization. For Dean, network media and communications technologies result in contradiction: they produce collective information and a communication mesh of ideas, *and,* they entrench individualism in which widely shared ideas are conceived less in terms of a self-conscious collective than they are as "viruses, mobs, trends, moments, and swarms." Division is common to this form of communication, as is its partialness, inseparability from power, and reliance on exclusion. For Dean, whatever could be available for "thinking and relating to others, is always already distanced." Moreover, as we go about enthusiastically participating in these networks, we end up building the very "trap that captures us," for as communication is subsumed by capitalism it no longer provides a "critical outside" but instead serves

capital by deskilling, surveillance, and the intensification of work—the "tether" of 24/7 availability.

For Dean, the common is seen as a dynamic process, a global network of social relations that is infinite and characterized by surplus.[56] Here, expropriation does not leave many with little for there is abundance. Nevertheless, Dean details how networked communications provide multiple instances of expropriation and exploitation of the common through data, metadata, networks, attention, capacity, and spectacle, that each form an interconnected exploitation of the "social substance." Communicative capitalism is shown by Dean to seize excess, surplus, and abundance and ultimately privative this social substance that constitutes us and its potential. As each person is productive as a communicative being (and through their communicative interrelations) any ownership or profit thereof is clearly theft. As Dean concludes, to persist in the practices through which communicative capitalism exploits the social substance, is to "fail to use division as a weapon on behalf of a communist project." The challenge is to "break with current practices by insisting on and intensifying the division of, and in, the common."

Turning to intertheoretical debates, Nina Power (Chapter 6, Volume 3) engages with the complex and often vexed history of Marxism and feminism. Power raises the question of what it could mean to think of Marxism and feminism without subsuming or postponing demands of women in socialist struggle. Power reinterrogates the famous *Unhappy Marriage* collection of 1981[57] and more recent attempts to bring Marxism and feminism together in the work of Sylvia Federici, Arlie Russell Hochschild, and Nancy Fraser, among others. Beginning with the question of domestic labor, feminists such as Federici have made the foundational connection between every economic and political system and reproduction, finding this to be the site where the contradictions inherit to alienated labor are the "most explosive."[58] Domestic labor creates surplus value, in both direct and indirect ways, but the claim for the recognition of this value does not call for a "demand for wages" for this work, nor its continuance, but rather "precisely the opposite."[59] In contemporary capitalism, work is rebranded as flexible, but in reality this corresponds to less pay and fewer hours, especially for women. Labor is dominated by precarity and while this conceptualization is now popular in contemporary theorizations of work, such as in Standing's often cited text, Power's finds that this is merely "catching-up" with feminist insights from 40 years ago. Similarly, Hochschild and others have identified key aspects of the feminization of labor, that is, how work now often takes on attributes normally associated with women—communication, service, care work[60]—that is coupled with how elements typically associated with the private sphere—love, leisure, personality—have increasingly become "attributes exploited by employers to give their customers the 'best service.'"

Yet despite these radical insights into the fundamentality of domestic labor and reproduction necessary to sustain capitalism, Power finds that feminism—particularly second-wave feminism—has, in some ways, been co-opted by capitalism for what she calls "deeply reactionary aims," including the justification of imperial wars and the pushing of consumerism. Power points to Fraser, who notes the relative failure of second-wave feminism to transform institutions. This has legitimated structural transformations that contradict "feminist visions of a just society" and effectively neutralized feminism's demands. Power reiterates the confronting question of whether there is some "elective affinity" between second-wave feminism and neoliberalism.[61] Here, capitalism's absolute benefit from the mass entry of women into the workforce suggests the need for the reconnection of feminism and class to the critique of capitalism, one that takes into account the economic reliance (even dependency) of capitalism on the labor of women and the international dimensions of struggle against this global form of exploitation. Power emphasizes the urgency of reuniting these approaches, which remain incomplete without each other, toward the reassertion of the "social totality" or what she describes as a "total critique of the existing world—work, family structure and patriarchy combined."

Continuing with the development of theoretical connectivities between Marxism and other radical approaches, Werner Bonefeld (Chapter 7, Volume 3) engages with critical theory and the question of the means and ends of revolution in relation to contemporary socialist responses to austerity. Basing his account on Walter Benjamin's *Theses on History*,[62] Bonefeld posits that revolution is a struggle to stop the progress of historical time, riddled as it is with the muck of the ages, in order to achieve liberation in the "here and now," rather than in some "tomorrow that never comes." For Bonefeld, as for Benjamin, a class-ridden society requires that the history of class struggle, rulers and ruled, comes to a "standstill." That is, as communism seeks universal human emancipation within the commune of "communist individuals,"[63] it can only find positive resolution in a classless society. Viewed in this light, Bonefeld claims that traditional communist forms of organization—and the fetishization of labor, which is itself a concept of bourgeois society—belong to the world whose progress of historical time needs to be stopped, for they presuppose the working class as a productive social force that deserves a better deal. The notion that history is on the side of the oppressed, in turn, fortifies the view that "progress is just around the corner." For Benjamin this is nothing but corrosive and delusional. Pauperization, poverty, and alienation are part of the deplorable *conditions* of capitalism; they are not avoidable *situations* that can be made good for the laborer, but require a revolutionary change in "social relations of production" to overcome. As Bonefled makes clear, for critical theory, communism is not a labor economy; it does not compete

or derive itself from capitalism. It is its negation. Communism entails fundamentally different conceptions of social wealth: the idea of a society of the free and equal, or "the autonomy of the social individual in her own social world."[64] Communism and human emancipation, then, is recast as the "[h]humanisation of social relations," which in the present can only be expressed as "the negation of the negative world."

Turning toward the praxeological concerns of revolutionary organization—a theme that cuts across the three closing chapters of the series—Rodrigo Nunes (Chapter 8, Volume 3) takes up Badiou's "widespread search" for a new figure of the militant to replace the vanguard of "Lenin and the Bolsheviks."[65] Questions of organization have been propelled by the mass movements of 2011, seeking to prevent the dissipation of these mobilizations and the maintenance of their "powerful" yet "diffuse" desire for radical change. Nunes's method is to look beyond externally created models (like vanguardism) toward "*what is needed*," something that he defines as an idea in progress. The central problem Nunes identifies in vanguardism is that it tends to perpetuate the militant "as the most advanced detachment in the revolutionary movement"—the mediators, bureaucrats, and functionaries of revolution, power, and truth. Yet, conversely, those who look to spontaneity as the panacea against vanguardism, based on the belief that it is *the process itself* which, if "left to its own devices," will "show the way," are shown by Nunes to be equally capable of functioning repressively. This is because "by replacing the uncertainty proper to every situated, subjective decision with a certainty *of the process itself* . . . not only is the process ascribed teleological certainty (solutions *will* appear), it is made into something external to the agents that constitute it . . ."

Focusing on the network organization of the 2011 movements, Nunes shows that these do not, in and of themselves, eliminate vanguards. Such networks have *hubs* that link with other nodes and clusters, which are clearly not horizontal. Leadership still exits, but it is distributed (distributed leadership) in the sense that isolated initiatives can be communicated across the network and "trigger positive feedback loops that increase their impact exponentially." Hence, spontaneity is not miraculous but always induced by a germ of action at precise moments. In all of these ways, Nunes claims vanguardism is not eliminable, but can have a positive attribute as a vanguard-*function* that *leads* only to the extent that it is *followed.* Nunes finds a number of advantages in redescribing the phenomena of mass movements in terms of leadership, representation, and vanguard. By demonstrating their continued existences allows for a better understanding of their potential and their risks, while at the same time bringing the subjective dimension back into non-vanguardist revolutionary politics. By positing the question in terms of "what do *we* need" in order to further

"multitudinous, polycentric, open-ended processes *in the direction of systemic change*," leaves open a space for the collective task of "identifying the paths, leverages, potentials" for pursuing such systemic change.

The conundrum of the 2011 mass mobilizations was that their openness attracted large numbers but simultaneously made concerted action difficult precisely because any decision would risk a point of closure, drawing division, creating separation. Here, Nunes's framework offers useful proscriptions, some of which he takes from the popular agent of Liberation Theology. Of note is the notion of tweaking as a metaphor for being *inside* a process that has much more momentum that any individual agent, though each agent, as a constituent part(s), has some control. For Nunes, this "eliminates the *transcendence of agent over process* proper to vanguardism, without instituting *a transcendence process over agent*." The other he calls "*care for the whole*," a capacity to think strategically to employ existing conditions for political impact that takes into account the development of the "political process as a whole, rather than of an individual organization or initiative."

Following on from Nunes's prescriptions for the militant in the 21st century, Keir Milburn (Chapter 9, Volume 3) looks to the assembly as the dominant form of organization in the Arab Spring, the Spanish Indignados, and Occupy. Assemblyism was the key means of meeting, of displaying commonality, of exhilaration. Yet Milburn points to the organizational lessons of Assemblyism, arguing that while they are necessary, they are ill suited to some necessary functions and therefore insufficient for contemporary movements, which must overcome material and social inequalities to reestablish democracy. The point for Milburn is to "move beyond" Assemblyism. Looking at Hardt's reading of Jefferson,[66] Milburn sees in the valorization of rebellion the need for the periodic reopening of the revolutionary event, what he calls "a processual transition," in which new forms of fetishization can be overcome and new problematics emerge. Politics must start from the present, but cannot determine in advance the end of this critical engagement. Yet, as Milburn identifies, this presents a particular challenge to the prefigurative notion of Assemblyism in which "ultimate ends determine current means": for how can "the same organizational structures really be equally appropriate throughout this whole process of transformation when it will be peopled by quite different subjectivities and have quite different functions to fulfill[?]"

Milburn concurs with Dean that the radical inclusivity of Occupy's General Assembly ultimately obscured decision-making, leading to its usurpation by unaccountable groups,[67] and that its emphasis on expression came at the expense of efficient decision-making, which risked "unexamined 'common sense' assumptions and dogma." To overcome this, Milburn proposes to supplement horizontal structures not just with the

vertical and diagonal structures proposed by Dean, but also with Guattari's "transversal" structures,[68] designed to "facilitate transformations in group desire," to push beyond the "limits of a groups' common sense assumptions," and thereby "allow new foci of meaning to develop and new political problems to emerge." In terms of contemporary organization, this may help shift "the consensus of the movement, of introducing new political problems, new repertoires and new frames of reference"—put simply, ensuring the Jeffersonian call for periodic reopening of the revolutionary event. For Milburn, the communist project must be a "processual one," transforming our institutions and ourselves. Its organizational form must be subject to change, involving collective self analysis, where transversality allows for the "emergence of new foci of sense and enabling the movement to move from one problematic to the next."

Continuing with the theme of communist praxis, and offering a fitting conclusion for *Communism in the 21st Century* as a whole, John Holloway (Chapter 10, Volume 3) states that the noun, communism, cannot adequately express the self-determining type of social organization that "we" desire. Rather, it suggests a notion of "fixity" incompatible with "collective self-creating." In distinction, Holloway moves to a conception of "communising," defined as "the moving against that which stands in the way of our social determination of our own lives." Whereas a noun closes on identity, communising gestures toward the "overflowing of identity," a "bursting-beyond," "constant moving," and "subverting." This sets up the self-determining movement of communising against the alien determinations of social forms that, as Marx shows in *Capital,* entrap the "potentially unlimited force of human creation" within the commodity form.[69] But the essential task for Holloway is to *understand* these social forms as capitalist. That is, in order to know how and why "our activity produces a society that denies our activity," we must understand our dual character, which results from the bifurcation of concrete and abstract labor. Echoing the discussion from Eden's chapter, Holloway gives the example of a table made through concrete labor, whose existence speaks directly of the act of making—there is no separation. Yet in abstract labor, the same activity is now seen from the perspective of producing commodities: the table is reduced to market value. It becomes a thing outside of its maker, alienated, "independent of the act of creation." For Holloway, it is this reduction of our activity to abstract labor that leads to "rigidification" or the "coagulation of social relations into social forms" into "alien determinations" that entrap "the endless potential and creativity of concrete labor, that is, of human doing." Both concrete and abstract labor are social; the point is that abstract labor dominates concrete labor, "capitalism dominates the communal." For Holloway then, communising, wealth, doing, all continue to exist under capitalism but remain the "hidden substratum of a social form" so that the "common

doing" within capitalist society "is hidden from view by its capitalist form." Yet while communality and concrete labor remain trapped within this capitalist form, they "also push against and beyond them." The fact that the notion of revolt exits means that subordination is not total within the capitalist form. There is a dynamism and potentiality to these social relations, which, for Holloway, must be understood as "processes of forming, not as established fact." Under the private determinations and apparent "solidity of money" lies mere appearance. Beneath that lies struggle and enforcement. The surface of commodities, abstract labor, capitalism is nothing without wealth, concrete labor, and communality. This leads Holloway to a stark conclusion: it is "we" who are the crisis of capital, "the latency of another world." In these relations reside the possibility for "the unchaining of our doing, the reclaiming of the world." But communising is for Holloway inherently plural, the task is of "constant communising," of "recognizing, creating, expanding and multiplying the communisings" that exist in the "here and now."

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Today's world is replete with crises and transformations. It holds both immense potentialities for human tragedy and immense possibilities for human emancipation. The point—for Marx, as for us—is to *change* it.[70] As David Harvey has observed, the global conditions of the working classes at the beginning of the 21st century suggests that the "grand goal" in the final exhortation of the *Manifesto*—for all workers of the world to unite—is more important now than ever.[71] The question is whether the specter of communism can be exorcised from its bloody past, captured as its ideal was by the ruthless domination of tyrants and madmen, and whether we can reanimate its spirit of equality, freedom, and community for human emancipation today. While a definitive conclusion is impossible given the vast differences in subject areas and the political, theoretical, and normative commitments of each author, what emanates from this series taken as a whole is the ongoing salience of the communist vision—however ambiguously expressed by Marx and others—and the sublation of the content of this vision (including organizational, practical and political content) in, and for, the distinct social conditions of the 21st century.

There seem to be two aspects in this movement. The first is the deliberate withdrawal from a myopic focus on state power and statist politics toward what can be best described as a politics of relationalism. The second is a retreat from economism and determinism, toward a new—or rather an old—conception of the common. Both typify a movement to an increased awareness of the centrality of intersubjectivity in communist theory and practice. It is no longer the capture of state power but the co-creation of genuine social relations in a "vast association"; it is no longer

productivism but an economic commons in which participation and creativity are to secure substantive equality for all that illuminates the communist horizon of today.

This renewed emphasis in the communist project on intersubjectivity, relationalism, and the common is detectable across the series. In Volume 1, Marx's vision of communism was uniformly seen to be the actualization of individual capacities and powers made in association with all others. The conditions for this all-sided development of the individual, including the expansion of ethical community and forms of solidarity, were sharply opposed to the narrowness of bourgeois freedom and the shallowness of its content that deformed human relations under capitalist appropriation and exploitation. The frequent use of terms to describe communism like the collectivity, communal nature, recognition, cooperation, worker communities, and genuine social relations of association, juxtaposed against the asociality, competitiveness, fragmentation, alienation, and ideology of self-interest inherent to capitalist order. Similarly in Volume 2, calls for direct, autonomous, horizontal, spontaneous, and non-hierarchical forms of self-organization, or of viewing revolution as conscious, social creation, and collective human activity, and even the recognition of the unique type of relations within the commune are all examples of this renewed focus on social relations to meet the challenges of contemporary capitalism, imperialism, and the state. Even within existing state forms of socialism this renewed emphasis on the importance of social relations was evident: in the future direction of Chinese development, for channeling reforms in Vietnam back to socialism, for the resilience of the Cuban Revolution against path-dependency of neoliberal capitalism, or of the novel practices of communisation from below underway in Venezuela. Indeed, the decline of traditional forms of radical working-class socialism is, arguably, directly attributable to its neglect of genuine social relations in its traditional political commitments in favor of socialism from above. Evidence of the fundamentality of social relations to the future of communism proliferated in Volume 3. Capitalism was resoundingly portrayed foremost as a social relation in which the relations of production that make possible the reproduction of labor were to be interrogated and challenged. Calls to reclaim the commons as a network of social relations or for the reassertion of the social totality for the purposes of critique and social regeneration illustrated the fundamentality of relationalism to the future of communist thought and practice. These were paralleled with the emphasis placed on attaining forms of organization aimed at transforming subjectivities, for providing the conditions of democracy through relations under communalization, and of opening human interactions against the rigidities of the capitalist social form.

What emanate from the series then are explorations of new forms of communist organization that are open and participatory, subject to

constant change and revision, that foster the generation of radical subjectivities and mesh diversity within a dynamic politics of movement—all of which indicate a transcendence of traditional forms of communist struggle *beyond* the state toward a growing appreciation of the radicalism present within a genuine politics of intersubjectivity. It takes little effort to see the connection here with Marx's description of life in communism in the *Grundrisse* as "the absolute movement of becoming."[72] In the context of today, this dynamism seems to offer a means to confront widespread depoliticization and the seeming directionlessness of many neo-materialist social movements, whether Occupy or recent events in Brazil, coalescing around a fluid idea of self-determination that is unbounded and ongoing: revolution in permanence. All of the chapters echo this notion of the radical humanization of social relations as the purpose or aim of communism today in the 21st century. This is not so much a revision of communism or of Marx however, but a reclamation of the humanist essence that was tragically lost to Real Socialism.

NOTES

1. Alain Badiou, *The Communist Hypothesis* (London: Verso, 2010); Alain Badiou, "The Communist Hypothesis," *New Left Review* 49 (2008): 29–42.

2. It should be noted that Žižek is the sole editor for volume two. Costas Douzinas, Slavoj Žižek (eds.), *The Idea of Communism* (London: Verso, 2010); Slavoj Žižek (ed.), *The Idea of Communism 2* (London: Verso, 2013).

3. Jodi Dean, *The Communist Horizon* (London: Verso, 2012); Bruno Bosteels, *The Actuality of Communism* (London: Verso, 2011); Michael A. Lebowitz, *The Socialist Alternative: Real Human Development* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2010).

4. Guy Standing, *The Precariat* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011).

5. David Graeber, *Debt: The First 5,000 Years* (New York: Melville House, 2011).

6. Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (New York, Penguin: 2005); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Commonwealth* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009).

7. For a few more notable examples see: Marcello Musto, ed., *Karl Marx's Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy 150 Years Later* (Abingdon, Routledge: 2008); Fredric Jameson, *Representing Capital: A Reading of Volume One* (London: Verso, 2011); Harald Bluhm, ed., *Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels: die deutsche Ideologie* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2010); Terry Eagleton, *Why Marx Was Right* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011); Paul Blackledge, *Marxism and Ethics: Freedom, Desire, and Revolution* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2012); Eric Hobsbawm, *How to Change the World: Tales of Marx and Marxism* (London: Little Brown, 2011).

8. For an interesting example see Mail Foreign Service, "Credit Crunch Boosts Sales of Karl Marx's Das Kapital in Germany," *Daily Mail,* October 16, 2008. http://

www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1078232/Credit-crunch-boosts-sales-Karl-Marxs-Das-Kapital-Germany.html

9. Some notable exceptions include Bertell Ollman, "Marx's Vision of Communism," *Critique* 8, no. 1 (1977): 4–41.

10. To reduce unnecessary and repetitive citations of chapters from the series within this introduction, all chapters are first introduced with the author's name followed by chapter and volume number. All quotes are subsequently taken directly from this author and chapter, unless otherwise stated.

11. Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844," in *Early Writings,* trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), 333, 365.

12. Michel A. Lebowitz, *The Socialist Alternative,* 42–45.

13. Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts," in *Marx-Engels Collected Works,* vol. 3, trans. Richard Dixon et al. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 304, 306.

14. Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in *Marx-Engels Collected Works,* vol. 3, trans. Richard Dixon et al. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 149, 151, 168.

15. Ollman, "Marx's Vision of Communism."

16. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy,* trans. Martin Nicolaus (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1973), 488, 515, 832.

17. Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," in *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels Selected Works in Two Volumes,* vol. 2 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962), 13–37.

18. The Soviet Constitution of 1936 instilled this socialist principle into law. Vladimir I. Lenin, *The State and Revolution* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 112–116.

19. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy,* vol. 3, ed. Frederick Engels (New York: Vintage Books, 1981), 957.

20. Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," 23–25; Lebowitz, *The Socialist Alternative,* 70–72.

21. Marx, Karl. *Capital,* vol. 3, 959.

22. Erich Fromm, "Introduction," in *Socialist Humanism: An International Symposium,* ed. E. Fromm (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1965), ix.

23. Federici builds on the idea developed originally by Negri. See Antonio Negri, *Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse,* ed. Jim Fleming and trans. Harry Cleaver (New York and London: Autonomedia-Pluto, 1991).

24. For example, see Dolores Hayden, "The Grand Domestic Revolution," in *The Grand Domestic Revolution: A History of Feminist Designs for American Homes, Neighborhoods and Cities* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985).

25. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology,* part 1, ed. C. J. Arthur (New York: International Publishers, 1988), 95.

26. Michael Lebowitz, *The Contradictions of "Real Socialism": The Conductor and the Conducted* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2012), 17–19.

27. Marx, *Capital,* vol. 3, 776.

28. Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology,* 45–46, 71.

29. Frederick Engels, *The Peasant War in Germany* (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1956), 33.

30. Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), 14.

31. Graham citing Karl Marx, *Selected Writings,* ed. D. McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 198, 202.

32. Michael Bakunin, *Statism and Anarchy,* ed. and trans. M. Shatz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 179; Michael Bakunin, "Program of the International Brotherhood," in *Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas,* vol. 1, ed. R. Graham (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2005), 85–86.

33. These ideas were advocated by Jean-Louis Pindy and Eugene Hins at the 1869 Basel Congress. See Daniel Guérin, ed., *No Gods, No Masters: An Anthology of Anarchism,* vol. 1 (San Francisco: AK Press, 1998), 184.

34. Vladimir I. Lenin, *Collected Works,* vol. 21 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1960–1970), 40, 241.

35. See Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in *Karl Marx: Early Writings* (London: Penguin, 1975).

36. Michael Löwy, *On Changing the World* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993), 96; Rosa Luxemburg, "The Junius Pamphlet," in *Rosa Luxemburg Speaks,* ed. Mary-Alice Waters (New York and London: Pathfinder, 1970), 269.

37. See Kevin Anderson, *Lenin, Hegel and Western Marxism* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 113.

38. Stathis Kouvelakis, "Lenin as Reader of Hegel," in *Lenin Reloaded: Towards a Politics of Truth,* eds. Sebastian Budgen et al. (London: Duke University Press, 2007), 174, 186.

39. World Bank, *Transition: The First Ten Years* (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 2002), Overview xv, xiv; UNICEF, *Women in Transition—A Summary. Regional Monitoring Report Summary,* no. 6 (1999), 13–14. http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/monee6/cover.pdf

40. The term comes from Timothy Garton Ash, *We the People* (London: Penguin, 1993).

41. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987).

42. See Adam Fforde and Stefan DeVylder, *From Plan to Market: The Economic Transition in Vietnam* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996).

43. Karl Marx, *The First International and After: Politics Writings,* vol. 3, ed. David Fernbach (London: Penguin, 1974), 212.

44. Bosteels cites here Aufheben, *A Commune in Chiapas? Mexico and the Zapatista Rebellion* (Toronto: Abraham Guillen Press & Arm the Spirit, 2002).

45. It should be noted that President Hugo Chávez was still alive at the time Azzellini wrote his chapter.

46. Antonio Negri, *Il Potere Costituente* (Carnago: Sugarco Edizioni, 1992), 382.

47. This can be glimpsed in, for example, Notes from Nowhere, eds. *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anti-Capitalism* (London: Verso, 2003).

48. Philip Roberts, "Importing Gramsci into Brazil," *For the Desk Drawer,* March 11, 2013. http://adamdavidmorton.com/2013/03/importing-gramsci-to-brazil/

49. Charter of Principles of the World Social Forum. http://fsm2011.org/en/wsf-2011

50. Jess Hill, "Assad's Useful Idiots," *The Global Mail,* September 11, 2012. http://www.theglobalmail.org/feature/assads-useful-idiots/374/

51. Vicken Cheterian, "Syria: Neo-Anti-Imperialism vs. Reality," *Open Democracy,* October 16, 2012. http://www.opendemocracy.net/vicken-cheterian/syria-neo-anti-imperialism-vs-reality

52. Slavoj Žižekek, *The Year of Dreaming Dangerously* (London: Verso, 2012), 73.

53. See Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth,* 380–381.

54. David Eden, *Autonomy: Capital, Class & Politics* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012).

55. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy,* vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Classics, 1990), 131–138.

56. This is in distinction to the commons that is finite and characterized by scarcity, the expropriation of which leaves a few with a lot and the many with nothing. Cesare Casarino, "Surplus Common," in *In Praise of the Common: A Conversation on Philosophy and Politics,* ed. Cesare Casarino and Antonio Negri (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 15.

57. See Lydia Sargent, ed., *The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: A Debate on Class and Patriarchy* (London: Pluto Press, 1986).

58. Silvia Federici, *Revolution at Point Zero* (New York: Autonomedia, 2012), 2.

59. Power quoting Silvia Federici, "Wages against Housework."

60. Hochschild calls this "emotional labour." See Arlie Russell Hochschild, *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling* (California: University of California Press, 2003 [reprint]).

61. Nancy Fraser, "Feminism, Capitalism and the Cunning of History," *New Left Review* 56 (March/April, 2009): 98–99, 108.

62. Walter Benjamin, "Theses of History," in *Illuminations* (London: Pimlico, 1999), 245–255.

63. Herbert Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), 127.

64. On this, see Werner Bonefeld, "Anti-Globalization and the Question of Socialism," *Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory* 34, no. 1 (2006): 39–54; Werner Bonefeld, "Global Capital, National State, and the International," *Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory* 36, no. 1 (2008): 63–72; Karl Marx, *Capital,* vol. I, 582.

65. Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul. La fondation de l'Universalisme* (Paris: PUF, 1997), 2.

66. Michael Hardt, "Thomas Jefferson, or the Transition of Democracy," in *The Declaration of Independence* by Thomas Jefferson (London: Verso, 2007).

67. This follows Dean's call for a post-Occupy communist party as the form of activity that expresses the desire for collectivity and transferential object or vehicle through which individuals can understand their actions and express their collective will. See Dean, *The Communist Horizon.*

68. Felix Guattari, *Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics* (New York City: Puffin, 1984), 17.

69. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy,* vol. 1, 125.

70. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach."

71. David Harvey, *Spaces of Hope* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 41.

72. Karl Marx, "Grundrisse," in *Marx-Engels Collected Works,* vol. 28., trans. Richard Dixon et al. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), 411–412.

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AUTHOR QUERY

[AuQ1]: Replaced the earlier dedication "To Dustin Brincat, brother, brethren, and comrade" with the new one" in all three volumes